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Abstract
IoT networks have already been widely deployed for its convenience and low-cost advan-
tage. However, due to the lack of self-protection mechanisms and the imperfect network archi-
tectures, many IoT devices are very vulnerable for malicious cyber-attacks, which will further
threaten the availability and security of information. Therefore, securing the network infras-
tructure while protecting data from malicious or unauthorized devices/users become a vital
aspect of communication network design. In the thesis, two types of IoT scenario are mainly
investigated, namely, IoT routing protection and smart community device authentication.
In IoT routing network, misbehaving routers affect the availability of the networks by drop-
ping packets selectively and rejecting data forwarding services. By adopting the distributed
consensus mechanism, we propose a blockchain-based reputation management system in IoT
networks to overcome the limitation of centralized router RM systems. The proposed solu-
tion utilizes the blockchain technique as a decentralized database to store router reports for
calculating reputation of each router. With the proposed reputation calculation mechanism,
the reliability of each router would be evaluated, and the malicious misbehaving routers with
low reputations will be blacklisted and get isolated. More importantly, we develop an efficient
group mining process for blockchain technique in order to improve the efficiency of block
generation and reduce the resource consumption.
In a smart community, current authentication approaches suffer from numerous challenges,
such as poor authentication efficiency, inflexible authentication approach and insecure infor-
mation sharing server. We propose a novel sidechain structure via optimized two-way peg
protocol for device authentication in the smart community in order to overcome the limitations
of existing approaches. The proposed sidechain structure requires the mainchain mining nodes
to only store the local mainchain blocks without downloading or updating the entire main-
chain after each block generation. By using Simplified Payment Verification (SPV) consensus
mechanism, the existence of the target authentication information could be proved. Moreover,
we propose an optimized two-way peg protocol in the proposed sidechain system in order to
prevent the worthless information attack during the information sharing procedure.
Keywords: IoT, routing protection, smart community, blockchain, sidechain, two-way
protocol, reputation management, device authentication, information sharing.
Summary for Lay Audience
With the emergence of wireless communications and smart devices, lots of progress have
been made in the field of Internet of Things (IoT). IoT networks have already been widely de-
ployed for its convenience and low-cost advantage. However, due to the lack of self-protection
mechanisms and the imperfect network architectures, many IoT devices are very vulnerable
for malicious cyber-attacks, which will further threaten the availability and security of infor-
mation. Therefore, securing the network infrastructure while protecting data from malicious or
unauthorized devices/users become a vital aspect of communication network design.
The emerging blockchain technology, with the inherent decentralized consensus mecha-
nism, provides a promising method to maintain a secure peer-to-peer network. By adopting
the distributed consensus mechanism of blockchain, i.e. Proof of Work (PoW), trust relation-
ships can be established among its members, even some of the entities may not be fully trusted.
In the thesis, two types of IoT scenario are mainly investigated, namely, IoT routing protec-
tion and smart community device authentication. For IoT routing protection, we propose a
blockchain-based reputation management system in IoT networks to overcome the limitation
of centralized router RM systems. More importantly, we develop an optimized group mining
process for blockchain technique in order to improve the efficiency of block generation and
reduce the resource consumption. The simulation results validate the distributed blockchain-
based RM system in terms of attacks detection and system convergence performance, and the
comparison result of the proposed group mining process with existing blockchain models il-
lustrates the applicability and feasibility of the proposed works.
For smart community device authentication, we propose a novel sidechain-based authen-
tication scheme for a smart community in order to overcome the limitations of existing ap-
proaches. To prevent the worthless information injection attack during the information sharing
procedure, we also propose an optimized two-way peg protocol. Consequently, the simula-
tion results prove the superiority of the proposed scheme in terms of reducing authentication
time, improving information management efficiency and decreasing storage consumption as
compared to existing works, and the applicability and feasibility of the optimized two-way peg
protocol have been approved.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Overview of IoT Networks
With the proliferation of Internet-enabled smart devices, Internet of Things (IoT) networks
have attracted significant attention of both academics and industry professionals [1]. IoT net-
work is the network that allows different types of smart devices to connect and exchange data
in order to realize the demands of ”Smart Life” [2]. Compared to the traditional Internet,
IoT network has strong inclusiveness towards the categories of end-user devices (IoT devices).
For instance, it does not limit its Internet connectivity to standard devices, such as computers,
smartphones and tablets. Any range of physical devices and everyday objects embedded with
IoT technology can communicate and interact with others through the Internet, and they can
be remotely monitored and controlled. For example, the temperature in a smart home can be
adjusted remotely by IoT networks.
With these IoT-enabled intelligent devices, IoT networks have played a fundamental role
in many different scenarios [3]. Fig. 1.1 shows some typical applications of IoT networks,
including medical and health care, smart home and transportation. Taking health care as an
example, the patient’s blood pressure and heart rate can be monitored and analyzed according
to IoT health monitoring devices readings collected. Moreover, connecting in-home monitoring
devices to hospital-based systems can be implemented to ensure an accurate health protection
with IoT networks. With millions of IoT devices being deployed every day, an enormous
amount of data and information will be generated and analyzed every day, which will totally
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redefine the way people live [4].
IoT Networks
Medical and 
Healthcare
Smart Home
Smart City
Industry 4.0
Transportation
Environmental 
monitoring
Figure 1.1: Typical applications of IoT networks.
The generation of IoT networks precisely meets the needs of automation and intelligent
applications. However, both memory capacities and energy resources of IoT devices are quite
limited, due to the constraints of low manufacturing and application costs. These immanent
restrictions will cause several challenges when implementing the IoT networks.
The first challenge is the security concern of the personal data [3]. Personal data collected
by end-user devices is uploaded to the cloud server through IoT smart devices for the purpose
of monitoring and data analysis. Due to the computational and hardware related constraints,
IoT devices could be compromised by attackers to act maliciously. For instance, due to the
lack of self-protection mechanisms, IoT devices are very vulnerable for different malicious
cyber-attacks, such as information stealing, selfish attacks and identity usurpation. Especially
in large-scale IoT networks with enormous amounts of smart devices, the effects of misbehav-
ing devices are more remarkable regarding to the data transmission accuracy and information
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security.
Another challenge is the imperfection of the existing network security structure in IoT net-
works [5]. Owing to the decentralized nature of IoT networks, collaborative environments can
be achieved among IoT devices for the improvement of energy efficiency and data accuracy.
However, the existing IoT network security system structure still relies on the traditional cen-
tralized model and the reliability of the third party, which violates the purpose of designing
IoT networks. Therefore, how to design a decentralized IoT network security system structure
while providing excellent performance in attack defense needs to be investigated.
Additionally, efficiency improvement is also critical in IoT networks due to the limited re-
sources [6]. If the designed works increase too much additional burden to the smart devices, the
network could suffer from bottleneck communications and large processing latencies, which
limit the system Quality of Service (QoS) performance. Thus, it is necessary to develop a
decentralized platform in IoT networks for stringent QoS provisioning required by IoT appli-
cations.
In conclusion, IoT networks play an irreplaceable role in providing services for residents
with both public city infrastructure and private smart devices. Whereas, there are still several
challenges that need to overcome.
1.2 Thesis Motivations and Objectives
As we mentioned above, IoT networks have been applied to many different applications, and
there are still many severe challenges needed to be resolved. In this thesis, we mainly focus on
two scenarios: routing process in IoT networks and device authentication process in IoT smart
community.
1.2.1 Routing Process in IoT Networks
Since a large amount of valuable data collected by end-user devices will be transmitted to the
cloud server through the IoT routing layer in IoT networks, protecting the routing process is
vital for data security and privacy-preservation.
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Attack Detection: IoT networks are normally applied in both private and public networks
for data exchanging and data analysis. Since IoT devices have constrained resources, self-
protection mechanisms can hardly be achieved among IoT routers in the routing layer. Once
attackers capture a routing node, the cryptography information can be extracted and utilized for
working legally in the network. As a result, the whole network is threatened by cyber attackers
and different malicious routing behaviors. Thus, the research objective is securing the IoT
routing process by detecting the misbehaving devices while mitigating the resource restriction.
Security Framework Enhancement: A security management system is required in order
to monitor the misbehaving IoT routers. Although the centralized security system model can
provide a reasonable detecting performance, centralized framework is not suitable for the de-
centralized nature of IoT networks. In addition, with the number of IoT devices dramatically
increasing in the network, the centralized security center cannot properly manage the infor-
mation for the whole system. Therefore, our specific objective is designing a decentralized
security management system for IoT routing protection.
System Efficiency Improvement: During the detection process of the security management
system, certain calculation schemes would be applied in order to rank the trust of each router
in the IoT routing layer. Considering the limited energy resources of each IoT router, a rea-
sonable light-weighted calculating scheme should be used to improve the system efficiency
and detection performance. Hence, improving the efficiency of security system for IoT routing
protection is another research object.
1.2.2 IoT Smart Community
Smart community is a virtual environment composed of different IoT systems, such as smart
homes, smart health, and smart public buildings [7]. Personal data are collected and processed
in each system by smart devices, and then get shared among the community in order to im-
prove community safety, home security, healthcare quality, and emergency response abilities
[8]. Both device authentication process in each smart system and information sharing process
within sub-systems are the major obstacles for privacy protection in smart community due to
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imperfect mechanisms and the resource-constrained nature of IoT devices [9].
Authentication Efficiency Improvement: Most of the existing IoT smart systems rely on
a gateway device to manage the local device authentication process. With the number of IoT
devices increasing in the system, the burden of the centralized server will increase dramatically.
In this case, the system will undergo bottleneck communications and large processing latencies,
which limit the system Quality of Service (QoS) performance. Thus, the research objective is
improving the device authentication efficiency in each system of the smart community.
Adaptive Authentication Methods: There are many authentication methods existing for
smart devices with different computational powers and scenarios, such as One Time Password
(OTP), Pre-Shared Key (PSK) and Certificates [10] [11] [12]. However, all the smart devices in
the same system can only use one authentication method regardless of different computational
powers. Therefore, an adaptive authentication mechanism that can apply various authentication
methods in the same system should be proposed in order to ensure a more flexible and resilient
security for each device.
Information Sharing Server Enhancement: In a smart community with many assembled
smart systems, it is normal to have IoT devices that move from one system to another. In this
case, the authentication information should be transferred among different systems. Existing
solutions involve a centralized third-party server to handle the shared information by assum-
ing it is fully trustworthy. However, the whole system will suffer from the risk of one-point
failure, and the security of personal data will be threatened. Hence, designing a decentralized
information sharing structure for smart community is another research objective.
1.3 Contributions of the Thesis
The main contributions of this thesis are summarized as follows:
• A comprehensive description of blockchain technology is presented in order to show the
benefits of applying this technology into the IoT environments. In particular, both struc-
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ture and operation procedure of the blockchain technique are introduced. Proof of work
(PoW), as the core technology of the blockchain technique, has been summarized with a
flowchart. Additionally, several blockchain related concepts are also presented, as they
are the basis of the proposed models in the later chapters. Sidechain technology, as an
extended technology of blockchain, is introduced in details and compared the technical
aspects with the blockchain technology. After that, several promising research areas for
blockchain technology have been outlined, and some representative works are also sum-
marized. In the end, an objective appraisal towards blockchain technology is also given
for the purpose of an in-depth study of blockchain.
• A blockchain-based reputation management system for IoT routing protection in IoT
networks is proposed in this thesis. The contribution of this work is twofold. Firstly, we
proposed a 4-steps blockchain-based reputation management system in order to evaluate
the reliability of each route. As a result, the malicious misbehaving routers with low
reputations will be blacklisted and get isolated. Secondly, in order to introduce the
blockchain technology into the IoT environment, an efficient group mining technique
has been proposed. The efficient group mining simplifies the mining procedure by setting
mining nodes into group to mine the same block. The nonce value range of each mined
block has been calculated and distributed to each group members. The computational
powers of each group has been balanced in order to prevent 51% attack.
• A sidechain-based authentication scheme via optimized two-way peg protocol for smart
community is proposed in order to overcome the challenges caused by existing blockchain-
based method. The contribution of this work is twofold. Firstly, we propose an opti-
mized sidechain structure for device authentication in the IoT smart community. Instead
of downloading and updating the entire mainchain after each block generation process as
traditional sidechain technology, the proposed structure save a reference mainchain block
at local memory and use SPV proof to prove the existence of the information. The pro-
posed structure consumes less storage consumption, and gets more efficient when search-
ing the target information. Secondly, in order to protect the smart community from the
worthless information injection attack and ensure the normal operation of sidechain tech-
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nology in the IoT environment, an optimized two-way peg protocol has been proposed
based on dynamically analyzing the trust value of the target device.
1.4 Thesis Outline
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows:
In Chapter 2, security challenges are briefly introduced for each IoT scenario (IoT routing
process and smart community). Followed by this, existing technical solutions are summarized
and analyzed according to the different categories. In IoT routing protection, both Routing Pro-
tocol for Low power and Lossy Networks (RPL) based solutions and reputation management
based solutions are illustrated. For authentication process in smart community, both traditional
centralized model and decentralized model are analyzed and compared. After that, a particular
solution analysis for each IoT scenario is suggested.
In Chapter 3, a detailed overview of blockchain technique is firstly introduced, includ-
ing the whole procedure of the block generation, the concept of Proof of Work (PoW) and
other blockchain related knowledge. Then, a detailed demonstration of sidechain technology
has been given, including its structure, the two-way peg protocol and its comparison results
with blockchain technology. After that, the applications of blockchain technique are catego-
rized based on different application fields, such as IoT, data security and medical applications.
Finally, both advantages and disadvantages of the blockchain technique are summarized for
future research.
In Chapter 4, a blockchain-based reputation management system for routing process pro-
tection in IoT networks is proposed. In the system model section, the proposed RM has been
divided into four steps: 1) distributed information collection from neighboring routers; 2) rout-
ing service evaluation; 3) router reputation calculation; 4) misbehaving router blacklisting. To
improve the implement efficiency of blockchain, an efficient group mining technique has been
proposed. Then, the technology comparison and overhead analysis are given. Finally, some
experiments have been conducted in MATLAB in order to evaluate the proposed blockchain-
based RM model in terms of attack detection, system convergence performance and efficiency
performance.
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In Chapter 5, we proposed a sidechain-based authentication scheme via optimized two-
way peg protocol for smart community. In the system model section, the local authentication
procedure achieved at private side blockchains has been illustrated into registration phase and
authentication phase. Then, the authentication information sharing procedure at the optimized
mainchain is presented. More importantly, to enhance the information security of the com-
munity, an optimized two-way peg protocol has been proposed by dynamically evaluating the
trustworthy of each smart device based on the authentication method, previous authentication
information sharing history and local authentication results. Then, the technology comparison
is given. The simulation results prove the the proposed scheme has advantages compared with
existing works in terms of reducing authentication time, improving information management
efficiency and decreasing storage burden. The applicability and feasibility of the proposed
optimized two-way peg protocol have also been approved.
Finally, all the contributions of this thesis are concluded in Chapter 6. The future research
plan and suggestion are discussed in Chapter 6 as well.
Chapter 2
Security Challenges in IoT Networks and
Existing Solutions
As we mentioned in the previous chapter, IoT network suffers from different types of malicious
behaviors and attacks due to the limited resources and memory space constraints. In this chap-
ter, we mainly focus on investigating the security challenges in IoT routing process protection
and device authentication process in IoT smart community. For each scenario, after introducing
the background of security problems, the existing solutions will be summarized and compared.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.1 introduces the IoT rout-
ing process. Some basic components of IoT routing layer are also presented, namely, end-user
devices, IoT routers and cloud server. Then, existing solutions are divided into two categories:
Routing Protocol for Low Power and Lossy Networks (RPL) based solutions and reputation
management based solutions. The scenario of device authentication process smart community
is discussed in Section 2.2. We firstly introduce the typical components of the smart system
in the community. Then, we point out the existing challenges in the smart community. After
comparing the centralized model with the decentralized model, we analyze the situation of the
smart community and give our suggestions. Finally, a chapter summary is drawn in Section
2.3.
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2.1 Routing Process in IoT Networks
2.1.1 Security Challenges in IoT Routing Process
With the increasing popularity of Internet of Thing (IoT) devices, massive amounts of IoT
data have been generated and collected on a continuous basis for data analysis and monitoring,
leading to increased requirements on communication and data security. The objective of IoT
routing layer is to forward the data packet collected to the destination.
The following Fig. 2.1 presents the basic components of IoT routing process, namely,
end-user device layer, routing layer and cloud server. In end-user device layer, different IoT
devices collect the target data and then transmit the data through the routing layer to the cloud
server for the purpose of storage and data analysis. The routing transmission can be one-hop
or multi-hop, which increases the difficulty of malicious behaving detection [13].
Routing Layer
End-user
Device Layer
Cloud
Cloud Server
Figure 2.1: Basic model of IoT routing process. The model consists of three layers: cloud
server layer, routing layer and end-user device layer.
Due to the computational and hardware related constraints, IoT routers do not have com-
plete self-protection mechanisms for malicious cyber-attacks, which makes IoT routing layer
one of weakest portions in the IoT data forwarding process [13]. In order to ensure the Qual-
ity of Service (QoS) required by IoT applications and secure the personal data required by
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users, IoT routing protection is critical. Thus, how to mitigate the limitation of IoT routers and
establish a trusted attack detection system is strongly needed in IoT networks.
2.1.2 Existing Solutions
To resolve the abovementioned security issues in routing process, many research have been
done in the wireless networks, such as mobile ad-hoc networks and wireless sensor networks.
Existing workable methods for routing protection can be classified into two categories, e.g.
Routing Protocol for Low power and Lossy Networks (RPL) based and reputation management
based.
2.1.2.1 Routing Protocol for Low Power and Lossy Networks
IoT network is one of the implementations of Low power and Lossy Networks (LLNs), in
which low-power Power Line Communication networks (PLC), Wireless Personal Area Net-
works (WPANs) and Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) are all included. LLNs devices have
highly resource constrained in terms of memory, battery life and processing power, which gen-
erates lots of security concerns during the routing process [14].
With these constraints, existing Internet protocols are unsuited for LLNs. Attackers can
capture the routing node and extract the data packet for illegal purposes. Thus, the Routing
Protocol for Low power and Lossy Networks (RPL) is designed aiming to avoid the insecure
router and minimize the packet forwarding cost [15]. RPL supports three basic traffic flows:
point-to-point (P2P) traffic, point-to-multipoint traffic (P2MP) and multipoint-to-point traffic
(MP2P) [16]. Best routing path in RPL is determined by its parent selection process using
the Objective Function (OF) and the Destination-Oriented Directed Acyclic Graph (DODAG)
process [17] [18]. Here, we will briefly explain these two main procedures of RPL.
Objective Function (OF) and Ranking Process: Objective Function (OF) is the core tech-
nique in RPL by determining the rule of parent selection and forwarding decision. OF con-
struction relies on four basic components: (i.) computing the path cost, (ii.) the rules for
choosing parents (including time, number of parents and identity of parents), (iii.) the rules for
ranking all the parents, (iv.) the way of advertising the path cost.
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Base on the evaluation of Objective Function (OF), all the nodes in RPL will be ranked and
the nodes with least rank will be chosen as the candidate parent nodes. Among the candidate
parents list, the best parent node can be found by applying different routing metrics, such as
throughput, link quality level (LQL) and expected transmission times (ETX) [19]. To apply
RPL to different optimization scenario, the routing metrics can be changed.
Destination-Oriented Directed Acyclic Graph (DODAG) Process: Destination-Oriented
Directed Acyclic Graph (DODAG) is the built graph in RPL that shows all the available paths
of root node and leaf nodes. In such tree topology of RPL, root node is the destination node
for all other devices. For example, a gateway in the smart home can be viewed as a root node,
and the rest devices are leaf nodes. With DODAG and OF, all the rank results can be shown in
the graph.
DODAG is consist of three basic ICMPv6 messages (i.) DAG Information Object (DIO),
(ii.) DAG Information Solicitation (DIS) and (iii.) Destination Advertisement Object (DAO).
The root node will send the DIO message to its neighbors and the neighbors will be required to
send the acknowledgment back. The neighbor who sends the acknowledgment will be allowed
to forward the DIO message to its own neighbors [20]. If the node outside the network wants
to join in, they will need to send a DIS message to require a DIO message. DAO messages
are sent by child nodes to the selected parent nodes after the DIO message received [21]. The
following Fig. 2.2 shows the RPL path construction by using DODAG process.
It was proved that the RPL protocol performed well in defending the external attackers [22].
However, when IoT routers are compromised to become internal attackers, the protocol can
hardly detect the malicious ones due to the insufficient computational capacity and resource
constraints [23]. For instance, RPL has strict rules for managing routing path selection and
optimized state. Once one router is attacked for illegal purposes, attackers can implement
malicious code inside in order to break routing operation rules of RPL. As a result, the whole
topology will be broken.
In order to enhance the security of RPL, many researches have been done and large amounts
of RPL-expanded technologies were proposed. In [24], a Fuzzy logic reasoning was applied
to RPL to transform heterogeneous routing metrics into one evaluation criterion. A two-stage
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Figure 2.2: RPL path construction using DODAG method.
fuzzification engine was proposed in their work: both expected transmission times (ETX) and
device energy are measured in order to increase the accuracy of path selection. The stability of
the system is achieved by decreasing the possibility of parents change.
A trust-based RPL model was proposed for enhancing the ability of the internal attack de-
tection [25]. By calculating the trustworthy of each router, routing path decision can be made
by using both trust directly available and trust indirectly from other routers. However, the cal-
culation of direct and indirect trust requires significant amounts of memory for recording the
history of both internal and external interactions among routers [26] [27]. These requirements
on computational and energy resource directly limit the application of RPL based routing pro-
tecting in resource-constrained IoT systems. Additionally, trust calculation based on RPL can
only be applied to limited neighboring routers due to its high resource requirements [28] [29].
2.1.2.2 Reputation Management Systems
The other category of routing protection is achieved through Reputation Management (RM) by
recording the previous behaviors of each router. By analyzing previous behaviors reported by
each router, the corresponding reputation of each router can be evaluated [30]. The routers with
high reputation values are considered as trustworthy, while those with low reputation values are
viewed as misbehaved ones [23].
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Powerful Reputation 
Management Server
Figure 2.3: Centralized reputation management system model. The IoT devices upload the
reputation reports to the central reputation management server, and the sever sends the blacklist
back to them.
As presented in Fig. 2.3, most of the existing reputation management methods follow a
centralized model where a powerful RM center collects, stores and analyses the reputation of
all routers. However, the centralized nature of the RM center has the risk of one-point failure,
which limits its application in IoT systems due to the stringent QoS requirement [31]. In ad-
dressing this challenge, a hierarchical trust management architecture was proposed for wireless
sensor networks with decentralized third parties involved for collecting the trust information of
all nodes [32]. Nevertheless, this method failed to consider the trustworthy of the third parties
used by assuming complete trust of third parties, and any entity of the third parties has the
power to manipulate the data without detection.
A blockchain-based reputation system was proposed in order to mitigate the risk of ma-
licious third party [33]. This scheme showed high reliability in attack defense by involving
external nodes for monitoring all routers’ behaviors. By applying the distributed consensus
mechanism of blockchain, i.e. Proof of Work (PoW), trust relationships can be established
among its members, even some of the entities may not be fully trusted [34]. In order to sim-
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plify the PoW process, they proposed a cooperative mining process among all the mining nodes
of the blockchain. As shown in Fig. 2.4, the target task of generating one new block has been
divided by all mining nodes for decreasing the time consumption and energy waste. The head
miner will firstly work on collecting all the reputation reports from the routers. Then, miner 2
will generate a genesis block, which is a block without header information. Miner 3 will cal-
culate the nonce value and send to miner 4 for verification. After verifying at the miner 4, then
block will be created and get broadcast to all the miners. Their experiment results proved the
proposed model in terms of improving the packet delivery ratio and decreasing communication
overhead by providing a decentralized reputation system [33].
Cooperative mining process
Report Uploading
Router 1 Router 2 Router 3
Packet forwarding Packet forwarding
Head miner Group: 
collect all the reports.
Miner Group 2: Generate 
a genesis block.
Miner Group 3: Calculate 
the nonce value.
Miner Group 4: verify 
the nonce and broadcast.
Figure 2.4: Model for cooperative mining process.
However, this proposed work did not specify the way of defining the trust among the
routers, and the relationship between the mining nodes and the external routing nodes. More-
over, the cooperative mining process assigned the mining task to four miner groups without
balancing the computational powers and information verification process are inside the miner
groups. There is certain caused risk that one of the malicious miner groups has much more
computational powers than other groups to dominate the blockchain and create fake transac-
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tions and it will threat the whole system, which is called 51 percent attack in blockchain [35].
2.1.3 Analysis
Based on these two categories of alternative solutions for IoT routing protection, reputation
management system is strongly suggested for its global decision scheme and high security per-
formance. However, there are two main issues existing in the reputation management system
that need to be fixed.
Firstly, a decentralized reputation management for IoT networks is needed. Most existing
reputation systems are using a centralized powerful third party to collect all the reputation
reports from routers and assuming all the routers can communicate with the center, which is
not suitable for a decentralized IoT network. In addition, the centralized IoT reputation systems
have a certain inherent vulnerability which is the one-point failure.
Secondly, a reputation mechanism which clearly define the trust of the routers in the IoT
environment is needed. There are many works on reputation mechanism in ad-hoc network,
and most accepted mechanisms utilize direct trust and indirect trust to calculate the reputation
for an entity. Each entity has its own judged results for other entities so that it can make a wise
decision when communicate with others, which means that every entity needs to calculate the
reputation for others. The calculation consists of two folds: direct trust value and indirect trust
value, and they are gained respectively based on the previous local reports which are saved in
its own memory and the judged results that are received from others. This requirement costs
lots of energy and recourses, which is clearly not suitable for IoT environment. Moreover, the
built trust relationship is partial among several devices due to the large resources requirement,
while the reputation management for IoT systems should have a global view to calculate the
reputation values for each entity. Thus, a decentralized reputation management for IoT routing
protection is in demand.
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2.2 IoT Smart Community
2.2.1 Existing Challenges in IoT Smart Community
IoT smart community is an IoT application scenario where different IoT systems are combined,
such as smart homes, smart health, and smart agriculture. In a smart community, personal
data are collected and processed in each system by smart devices, and then get shared with
other systems [8]. In order to protect the security of personal information, it is vital to make
sure that only the registered and authenticated devices can make use of the system and share
information. Otherwise, it will result in numerous potential security risks such as information
stealing, data tampering and identity usurpation [36]. Both local authentication process in each
smart system and information sharing process within sub-systems are the major obstacles for
privacy protection in IoT smart community due to imperfect mechanisms and the resource-
constrained nature of IoT devices [37].
In numerous IoT smart systems, the architecture still relies on a centralized model to handle
the local registration and authentication processes [38]. Fig. 2.5 presents a smart home system
where each device accomplishes the local registration and authentication processes through the
gateway. When the number of IoT devices increases, the communication burden of gateway
will be increased. Plus, it also increases the probability of one-point failure for the whole
system. Thus, how to design a decentralized communication structure for local registration
and authentication processes in smart system is worthy to investigate.
In smart community, information sharing among different IoT systems is often required
[39]. Especially, for the smart device with mobility features, its authentication information
is always required to be shared with other systems. Since there is no previous authorization
information existing in the new smart system, the device information should be uploaded to the
new system in order to get authorization again, which costs lots of time and energy. Moreover,
in a smart community, the data safety cannot be guaranteed if the resource system sends the
information to the target system directly since there is no uniform standard to judge the level
of trust. Therefore, a information sharing center should be designed in the smart community
for securing the personal data and the smart systems.
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Figure 2.5: A smart home model where the gateway handles the local registration and authen-
tication processes for each IoT device.
2.2.2 Existing Solutions
To solve the abovementioned authentication issues in IoT smart community, many studies have
been investigated. The existing models for authentication process in smart community can be
mainly classified into two categories, e.g. centralized model and decentralized model.
2.2.2.1 Centralized Information Sharing Server
Most of the existing structures in the real smart communities are using the traditional central-
ized model for the effective and efficient communication performance.
The typical smart community structure is usually composed of several smart sub-systems
and a centralized information sharing server. Each smart sub-system provides the direct in-
teraction with the local IoT devices through the gateway device, and the information sharing
server is responsible for realizing information sharing among the sub-systems. The local IoT
devices are connected to a gateway device by WiFi to form a Local Area Network (LAN),
and the sub-system communicate with other systems through the gateway device by common
TCP/IP Protocol.
Fig. 2.6 displays an existing centralized structure of an IoT smart community, where all
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sub-systems rely on a powerful third party server to realize the information sharing service.
The central third-party sever usually has high computational powers to handle all the informa-
tion from the smart community, and the structure shows high efficiency in processing the data
exchange and data analysis. A centralized model was proposed for IoT smart health scenario,
in which the information of patients will be shared among different sub-system [40]. In each
sub-system, a gateway is utilized for data analyzing and data forwarding to the information
sharing center. The centralized information server is used for efficient information sharing and
reaction. However, the centralized server could make the system under the risk of one-point
failure [41]. If the center has been compromised, the security of personal data is threatened.
More importantly, the centralized server could suffer from bottleneck communication when the
number of shared information significantly increase.
Smart Home
Smart Hospital
Smart FactoryThird-party Server
Information 
Sharing
Information 
Sharing
Information 
Sharing
Figure 2.6: An IoT smart community where each smart system is centrally managed by a
gateway, and all the systems rely on a third-party server for sharing information within the
community.
2.2.2.2 Decentralized Information Sharing Server
The other category of authentication structure in IoT smart community is achieved through a
decentralized model.
Although decentralized models were proposed for preventing the shortcomings caused by
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centralized models, lacking of inside consensus mechanism will lead to malicious attacks
among internal servers [42]. By reaching a consensus mechanism at each entity, a blockchain-
based method proposed in [43] has been viewed as an alternative solution for solving these
issues. Through establishing a blockchain in each gateway in smart systems, the blockchain-
based method distributively manages authentication information and realize the authentication
information sharing function. Fig. 2.7 presents the basic structure of this proposed blockchain-
based method, in which each gateway are viewed as the mining nodes for the blockchain. In
this way, the authentication information could be distributively saved and transferred among
different systems. With the PoW consensus mechanism, a trusted relationship among each
gateway from different sub-system can be built and the information shared can be trusted.
Smart system 1 Smart system 2
...
Blockchain
: Gateway
Figure 2.7: A Blockchain-based method for authentication process in IoT smart community.
Although this proposed structure makes the whole community as a decentralized peer-
to-peer database for sharing information, each smart IoT system is still centralized for local
authentication management. Instead of decreasing the burden of the gateway in each smart
system, the overload of each gateway has been increased by processing additional information
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caused by blockchain, which contains the authentication information from other smart systems
in the community [43]. This centralized nature of gateways has a risk of one-point failure,
which limits its application in IoT smart community due to the stringent QoS requirement.
Moreover, there is a chance that the successfully registered device has been attacked to be-
come a malicious device. In this case, the authentication information should not be shared with
other systems due to the concern of information security. The proposed blockchain-based au-
thentication method cannot prevent this risk because they did not provide a suitable evaluation
for the information that is saved in the blockchain.
2.2.3 Analysis
Based on the analysis of these two categories of device authentication models in smart commu-
nity, the decentralized authentication method with consensus mechanism is recommended due
to its high security performance. However, there are two main issues that should to be handled.
Firstly, the burden of the gateway in each sub-system should be decreased for a better
communication performance. The most promising solution is applying local blockchains at
each smart system. Instead of implementing a blockchain which contains all the authentication
information of all smart systems, the local blockchain only saves local device authentication
information and processes local device authentication. A decentralized trustworthy database
can be built among local mining nodes in each local blockchain which is guaranteed by the
PoW consensus mechanism [44]. Thus, with using the local blockchain, the personal infor-
mation in each sub-system can be securely managed and the overload of each gateway can be
significantly decreased.
Secondly, there should be a suitable information evaluation criterion to judge if the required
authentication information should be shared with other systems or not. It is normal in the smart
community to have some IoT devices with mobility features, such as drones and community
service robots. In this case, the authentication information should be allowed to be shared
with other sub-systems. However, if the target device has already been attacked to become
a malicious one, sharing its authentication information with other systems will threaten the
information security of other systems by giving the direct writing and reading authorities to the
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malicious device.
2.3 Chapter Summary
In this chapter, we mainly analyze the challenges and alternative solutions in IoT routing pro-
tection and device authentication process in IoT smart community.
For IoT routing protection, the IoT routing scenario has been fully introduced. Two main
types of existing solutions are demonstrated: RPL based solutions and RM based solutions.
Based on the comparison between these two method, we recommended using RM method for
IoT routing protection and then summarize two issues existing in RM method that should be
further investigated. For the device authentication process in smart community, we firstly intro-
duce the typical components of the smart system in the community and summarize the existing
challenges. Then, two types of smart community models have been presented, which are tra-
ditional centralized model and decentralized model. After the presentation and comparison,
we proposed to use decentralized model to overcome the challenges in device authentication
process in smart community. Two main problems of existing decentralized model have been
pointed out for further study.
Chapter 3
Blockchain Technology and Its
Applications
As we previously mentioned in Chapter 2, with the increase of Internet of Things (IoT) devices,
existing centralized networks can hardly manage the data security by presenting a single point
of failure, a threat of data tampering. A peer-to-peer decentralized network is strongly needed
in IoT, which can provide a symmetric relationship between the users and service providers.
Blockchain, as a decentralized database, offers a secure Peer-to-Peer (P2P) system in which
distributed entities collaboratively verify and confirm all the transaction histories [45]. As an
alternative to traditional centralized systems, blockchain has won the eyes of fields from both
academics and industry professionals.
In this chapter, we provide a detailed review of blockchain component, namely transaction
encryption, decryption and verification, and mining process. Two types of blockchain technol-
ogy are then introduced, namely public blockchain and private blockchain. We also present the
sidechain technology, an extended technology of blockchain, and compare with blockchain in
terms of technical details and security performance. Furthermore, various promising applica-
tions that blockchain technology has been applied to are well demonstrated, including Internet
of Things (IoT), data security and data sharing, identity management and medical applica-
tions, along with many other emerging applications. Finally, we mention several benefits and
challenges in blockchain implementation for a wide range of practical applications.
The organization of this chapter is listed as follows. Section 3.1 introduces the overview
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of blockchain technique. The detailed procedure and fundamental components of blockchain
are presented. In section 3.2, both public blockchain and private blockchain have been investi-
gated. Then, we introduced the sidechain technology in Section 3.3, including its structure and
protocol. In Section 3.4, several promising fields for blockchain applications are summarized,
such as crypto-currency, Internet of Things (IoT), and data security. After that, a pros and cons
analysis of blockchain technique is presented in Section 3.5. Finally, conclusions are obtained
in Section 3.6.
3.1 Overview of Blockchain Technique
Blockchain technology is a distributed database which shares transactions among all the mem-
bers and nodes in its network with certain consensus mechanism [42]. Each block is linked to
the prior one by the hash value of the block, which is shown as Fig. 3.1.
... ...Hash of block n-1
Block n
Transactions
Hash of block n
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Transactions
Hash of block n+1
Block n+2
Transactions
Figure 3.1: Basic structure of blockchain.
3.1.1 Key Pair and Signature Creation
For each entity in the blockchain network, it has a unique key pair of private key and a public
key for identity use [46]. The private key is the key that entity needs to store by itself without
letting anyone knows, while the public key is the key that is publicized to all users in the
network.
When a new transaction is generated between two entities, a secure hash algorithm (SHA)
will be applied to transfer the transaction into a message digest, which is the hash value that
connects the blocks. Then, the message digest will be encrypted by its private key to form a
digital signature, which can only be decrypted and validated by its public key. After that, the
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Figure 3.2: Procedure of the data encryption and broadcast.
transaction will be broadcast to all the blockchain members along with the signature waiting to
be verified. The procedure of the transaction encryption is shown in Fig. 3.2.
3.1.2 Signature Verification
When other blockchain entities receive the broadcast information, they need to do the transac-
tion decryption and signature verification to verify the information, as shown in Fig. 3.3.
The received transaction will be firstly hashed into message digest 1 and use the public key
of the sender which they have already stored in the local database to decrypt the signature and
get another message digest 2. If these two message digests are the same, this message is verified
successfully. During the verification, only when more than 50 percent of the devices in this IoT
network valid this transaction, this transaction is accepted [44]. Otherwise, this proposed one
will be discarded [47]. Then, the verified transaction will be required to be mined for a certain
period to be packaged into a new block and connect to the previous ledger.
26 Chapter 3. Blockchain Technology and Its Applications
Message Digest 1
890df7ab587d0d...42940a
Public Key
Digital Signature
Collected Data
SHA256
+
Received Data
890df7ab587d0d...42940a
Message Digest 2
Figure 3.3: Procedure of the signature verification.
3.1.3 Mining Process
After several transactions have been verified by the whole network, a new block with five parts
contained will be generated by miners, namely, the hash of previous, transactions, nonce value,
timestamp and current hash. The following Fig. 3.4 shows the block contents. Miners are the
entities who create and update the block to the whole network with high computational powers
[44].
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Figure 3.4: Detailed block contents and structure.
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In this process, a consensus mechanism called Proof of Work (POW) has been applied to
create a trusted relationship among all the users, which is the crucial element of the blockchain
technology [48]. The concept of POW was firstly mentioned by Cynthia Dwork and Moni Naor
in 1993. In 2008, Nakamoto SatoshI adopted the PoW method in Bitcoin systems to increase
its security, and this makes the PoW method popular [49]. The purpose of POW is to prove the
validity of the transaction of the new block. In the mining process, the miner needs to figure
out a puzzle problem to provide a proof for the current block, as shown below:
HashValue = hash(S HA256, hash(S HA256,M)) (3.1)
where M represents the data of this block, which includes transactions, timestamp, previous
hash, current hash and nonce value. This equation presents that the total content of the block
will be hashed twice, and the final hash value should meet the block difficulty requirement.
000000000000000000301fcfeb141088a93b77dc0d52571a1185b425256ae2fb
Block difficulty
Figure 3.5: Example of PoW consensus mechanism.
Fig. 3.5 shows an example of hash value, and the number of zeros in the beginning is the
difficulty of the block generation. The puzzle problem is to find the correct nonce value for
the current block to make sure that the final hash value can meet the block difficulty [49]. All
the blockchain members will work individually to find the correct nonce by inserting input
values one by one starting with 1. It should be noticed that the traditional mining process is a
competition among all miners in the system, and the miner who gets the correct nonce value
first will win the writing access for the blockchain. The whole procedure of PoW is shown in
Fig. 3.6.
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Figure 3.6: Flowchart of Proof of Work (PoW) mining process.
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3.2 Type of Blockchain Technology
There are mainly two types of blockchain technology, namely, public blockchain and private
blockchain [46].
3.2.1 Public Blockchain
The public blockchains are open source to all the entities of the network. This blockchain type
allows anyone entity to participate as its user, miner or developer. All the transactions that
saved on the public blockchains are fully transparent to every entity, which means every entity
can read and write to the blockchain, such as Bitcoin and Ethereum. The benefits of the public
blockchain are summarized as follows.
Decentralized Database: The public blockchain is designed to be a fully decentralized database.
All the entity of the blockchain has the same authority to read and write the validated transac-
tions.
Transparency and Immutability: The transactions on the public blockchain are transparent
to all the users and the transactions cannot be changed or manipulated by any entity.
High Security Protection: 51 percent attack is one of the most typical blockchain attacks
[35]. If the attackers can control more than 50% of computational powers in a Blockchain
network, the attacker will have the ability to manipulate any data without the consensus of the
community. The public blockchains usually have massive amounts of miners, which means it
is impossible for attackers to control more than 50% of miners at the same time.
3.2.2 Private Blockchain
The private blockchains are closed source to a certain group of entities in the network, such as
Ripple (XRP) and Hyperledger. In a private blockchain, a group of entities will be chosen to be
the miners and only miners have the read and write authorities to the blockchain. For the rest
users, they cannot read or write directly to the blockchain. They can only provide transactions
30 Chapter 3. Blockchain Technology and Its Applications
and get the instructions from the miners. The benefits of the private blockchain as summarized
as follows.
Privacy Benefits: Since the transactions on the blockchain can only be viewed by the certain
miners, the data privacy is selectively protected.
Efficient Services: The private blockchain is more centralized than the public blockchain.
Due to a certain mining group in the network, the transaction processing is more efficient.
Energy Saving: Since the regular users in the private blockchain do not save or update the
blockchain database, the energy could be saved for other communication.
3.3 Sidechain Technology
Sidechain technology, as an extended technology of blockchain, was firstly defined in 2014 for
enabling bitcoin and other crypto-currencies to transfer money among multiple blockchains
[50].
The structure of sidechain consists of a main blockchain with multiple small side blockchains.
The main functions of sidechain are allowing the key information to transfer from one chain to
others and reducing the burden of the main chain, which help the system to gain both agility
and freedom of using multiple networks [51].
3.3.1 Sidechain Structure
The following Fig. 3.7 presents the basic structure of the sidechain structure. The sidechain
structure consists of a mainchain and several side blockchains with different types of crypto-
currency used.
Both mainchain and side blockchains still flow the basic structure of blockchain technol-
ogy, including the block structure, PoW consensus mechanism and new block generation pro-
cedure. However, in order to make transaction between mainchain and side blockchains, a
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universal protocol should be applied for ensuring the operation of the system. In the following
subsection, we will present this protocol of sidechain technology.
Sidechain 1
Sidechain 6
Sidechain 5
Sidechain 4
Sidechain 3
Sidechain 2
Mainchain
Figure 3.7: Structure of sidechain technology. The sidechain structure consists of a mainchain
and several side blockchains. The crypto-currency used in each sidechain can be various.
3.3.2 Two-way Peg Protocol
Besides Proof of Work (PoW) consensus mechanism, a two-way peg protocol has been applied
during crypto-currencies transfer between main blockchain and side blockchains for preventing
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money double spending attack [52].
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Figure 3.8: Procedure of the two-way peg protocol in sidechain technology.
The two-way peg protocol is used when a transaction happens between the mainchain and
side blockchains [51]. The following Fig. 3.8 presents the protocol when mainchain needs to
transfer crypto-currency to the sidechain. Like PoW in bitcoin, a Simplified Payment Verifi-
cation (SPV) proof has been applied as the consensus mechanism for this procedure to prove
that the message/ required crypto-currency has been locked. The SPV was firstly described
in Satoshi Nakamoto’s paper [49]. Essentially, an SPV proof is composed of (a) transaction
ID, (b) transaction ID list and (c) a list of block headers demonstrating PoW [50]. The SPV
consensus mechanism allows the lightweight verifiers to check that some amount of work has
been committed to the existence of an output without downloading the entire blockchain. Since
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the SPV consensus mechanism only needs to download the block headers instead of the whole
blockchain, it can provide an efficient tracking service in sidechain systems.
When the mainchain is required to transfer money to the sidechain, the coins of the main
chain will be locked in a specific address and generate an SPV proof. Then the proof will be
sent to the sidechain. Based on the verified proof, the corresponding crypto-currency will be
unlocked in the sidechain. To synchronize these two chains, two waiting periods are defined:
Confirmation Period and Contest Period [50].
3.3.2.1 Confirmation Period
The Confirmation Period of a transfer between mainchain and side blockchains is a duration
for crypto-currency to be locked on the mainchain before it can be transferred to the sidechain.
During this period, an SPV proof will be created and sent to the sidechain.
The aim of this period is to prevent the double spending attack at the mainchain. The
Confirmation Period is a per-sidechain security parameter, which trades cross-chain transfer
speed for security [50].
3.3.2.2 Contest Period
The Contest Period is the waiting period designed for the sidechain side, and in this duration,
the newly-transferred coin cannot be spent on the sidechain until the Contest Period is finished.
The purpose of a Contest Period is to prevent double spending attack at the sidechain. In
this period, the received SPV proof will be verified by the sidechain and corresponding crypto-
currency will be unlocked to the receivers.
When a user wants to transfer coins from the sidechain back to the mainchain, they will
follow the same two-way peg protocol as the original transfer: send the coins on the sidechain
to an SPV-locked output, produce a sufficient SPV proof to the mainchain, and use the proof to
unlock a number of previously-locked outputs with equal denomination on the mainchain.
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Table 3.1: Comparison Results Between Blockchain Technology and Sidechain Technology.
Blockchain Technology Sidechain Technology
Purpose
Create a secure
decentralized database
Transfer crypto-currencies
between different systems
Technology Structure
One single chain broadcast
to all the mining nodes
one mainchain and
multiple side blockchains
Connection Method
Using hash function
to connect blocks
Using the two-way peg protocol
to connect the mainchain
with the side blockchains
Consensus Mechanism Proof of Work (PoW)
Proof of Work (PoW)
Simplified Payment Verification (SPV)
Connection Speed
Calculating the
nonce value
during PoW
Confirmation Period
and Contest Period
Fault Tolerance
System fails when
more than 50% of mining
nodes are compromised
Security faults on sidechain
will not affect the
security of mainchain.
Specific Attacks 51% Attack
Double Spending Attack
Worthless Information Attack
3.3.3 Sidechain vs. Blockchain
In this subsection, we compare the sidechain technology with the blockchain technology in
terms of the technical details and security performance. Table 3.1 illustrates the comparison
results between blockchain technology and sidechain technology.
Based on the comparison result, it can be concluded that sidechain is a promising method
for handling multiple networks in IoT environment. However, there are still some technical
mechanisms that should be further adjusted for applying into the IoT network scenarios [53].
It should be also noted that there is a certain risk in sidechain technology that side blockchains
keep sharing worthless information with the mainchain in order to disturb system operation.
This attack will cause constantly increase of the system load, while the existing two-way peg
cannot detect this attack[50]. If a mining node of sidechain has been compromised and per-
formed worthless information attack by uploading authentication information of malicious de-
vices to the mainchain, the security of the whole system will be seriously affected. Therefore,
an optimized two-way peg protocol with information evaluation scheme is strongly needed in
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order to apply sidechain technology into the IoT scenario.
3.4 Applications of Blockchain Technique
In this section, we introduce some promising applications of blockchain technology. Due to the
increasing demands of decentralized network structures and decentralized security, blockchain
application researches can be subdivided into several categories, namely crypto-currency, In-
ternet of Things (IoT), Data Security and Data sharing, Identity Management, Medical Appli-
cations and others.
3.4.1 Crypto-currency
Blockchain technology was first designed to record transactions for securing crypto-currency
in the financial industry in 2008 [49]. By using the PoW consensus mechanism, the blockchain
technology provides a new thought of protecting the crypto-currency from the electronic fraud
and double spending attack. Bitcoin, as one of the most famous applications of blockchain, has
got a lot of attentions from Businessmen and scholars to deeply analyze the blockchain.
With the idea of sidechain coming out in 2014, different types of crypto-currencies could
be efficiently transferred with each other. The appearance of sidechain technology promotes
various forms of crypto-currencies and financial transactions. Now, people are still using
blockchain technology and sidechain technology to redefine the crypto-currency and making
profits on it.
3.4.2 Internet of Things (IoT)
As the number of IoT devices increasing, IoT networks call for both decentralized structure
and secure environment, which blockchain technology is designed for. Due to the fact that
most IoT devices have low computational powers and limited resources, the way of applying
blockchain into IoT network should to be further considered.
The authors in [54] proposed a blockchain-based framework for IoT smart homes, and
the system consisted of three parts, namely smart home, cloud storage, and overlay. Inside
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the smart home, they proposed to implement a local blockchain to manage the security of
local storage, local IoT devices and other local components. Paper [55] proposed a novel way
of intrusion detection systems in IoT network called Lightweight Scalable Blockchain (LSB),
which uses a distributed trust algorithm, to overcome the limitation of resources of IoT devices.
They firstly divided IoT devices into clusters and each cluster has a cluster head (CH). In each
cluster, only the CH has the right to manage blockchain and all the other nodes will be allowed
to store one block for the CH to achieve a distributed database saving work. This method
satisfied the purpose of decentralized database and the purpose of collaborating distributed
works among nodes and sensors.
3.4.3 Data Security and Data Sharing
Considering the blockchain has the ability to secure the data with encryption technique and
share data within its members, this technology has several applications in data management.
A new application of blockchain for the data encryptions was introduced in [56]. The
authors came up with a distributed solution by combining the blockchain technology with
traditional cloud server. Instead of registering drone itself to the blockchain, each hashed
data would be collected from drone to the blockchain and then a blockchain receipt would be
uploaded to the cloud server to reduce the burden of computation and improve the security of
data collection. In [57], the authors demonstrated a novel way of using blockchain to protect
the security of data sharing. The blockchain they designed accepted two types of transactions:
(a) access control management transaction and (b) data storage and retrieval transaction. The
users/ end devices are no long need to trust the third-parties to analyze the data since they have
direct access to query the data through the off-blockchain storage solution.
3.4.4 Identity Management
Identity access control is a vital area for network security and data protection. The crypto-
graphically secure identity of blockchain can be used to further enhance the identity check by
using decentralized PoW consensus mechanism and transactions verification process.
A blockchain-based identity framework for IoT network was proposed in [58] called BIFIT,
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which is an autonomous identity management system for IoT devices. They work utilized a
global blockchain to obtain the signature of each device with both offline keys and online keys,
which create subject appliance identities and establish devices owner identities. They also
simulated a smart home testbed, and used the offline key pair to train the model and the online
key pair to test the model.
3.4.5 Medical Applications
Since the medical history of each patient is private and sensitive, securing medical service data
is crucial. By using blockchain technology, only the entity with the authorized key would be
allowed to get access to the certain medical history, and only the medical history that validated
by the authorized doctor will take effect in the medical blockchain database.
A blockchain-based framework for data protection during the health information exchange
was presented in [59]. They assigned three cryptographic keys to each user/patient during
the registration process, namely transaction private key, transaction public key and member-
ship key. By applying the smart contract, the system can monitor the connection between the
database layer and the user layer by setting the timers.
3.5 Analysis of Advantages and Disadvantages
Based on the blockchain process and its applications above mentioned, this technology does
have advantages that could be utilized for enhancing the existing network structure. However,
it still has disadvantages that should be mitigated in the designing stage [45] [46] [53]. In this
section, we will analyze the pros and cons of blockchain technology.
3.5.1 Advantages of Blockchain Technology
Here, we summarize the three typical advantages of blockchain technology, namely, distributed
architecture, transaction immutability and transaction transparency.
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Distributed Architecture: For each authorized blockchain user, the position and right of
managing the blockchain are equal, and no priority is existing. Thus, by applying PoW con-
sensus mechanism, the blockchain technology can provide a secure P2P architecture, which is
a distributed framework.
Transaction Immutability: Transaction immutability is the core function of the blockchain
technology. Once the data has been validated and saved in blockchain, the information can-
not be erased or modified due to the nature of blockchain design. In other words, the data
saved in blockchain is irreversible. Therefore, when it comes to protecting the truthfulness of
information, blockchain technology is an appropriate choice.
Transaction Transparency: Transaction transparency is another significant feature of the
blockchain technology. Due to the fact that all the blockchain members share the same ledger
and get updated after each block verification process, the transactions in each block are trans-
parent and can be extracted by each entity for checking purpose.
3.5.2 Disadvantages of Blockchain Technique
Blockchain technology is not a perfect technology because it still has some drawbacks to ad-
dress in order to be applied in other networks. Here, we mention two main disadvantages,
namely, transaction delays and security vulnerabilities.
Transaction Delays One of the biggest drawbacks of the blockchain technique is the time
relay during the process of traditional PoW consensus mechanism in new block generation. In
order to overcome this issue and apply the blockchain technology into the IoT environment,
suitable changes to the traditional PoW consensus mechanism are needed.
Security Vulnerabilities There have plenty of security attacks for blockchain technology,
such as 51 percent attack and double spending attack. For the 51 percent attack, the attackers
could manipulate any transaction without the any consensus mechanism if they can control
more than 50% of computational powers, which will totally threaten the data reliability of the
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system. For the double spending attack, the business thieves steal the crypto-currency after
they take control the blockchain. They would create a copy of the currency transaction to make
it look legitimate, or might erase the transaction altogether. This type of attack usually happen
at token-used blockchain system. Therefore, avoiding certain blockchain attacks is necessary
when designing the blockchain-related networks.
3.6 Chapter Summary
The new thought of decentralized network by using blockchain technology is getting more
mature and well implemented in the real-world day by day. The trust relationships can be
established among untrusted entities in blockchain through the PoW consensus mechanism,
which can provide more security protections for the decentralized database. However, in order
to fit different network environments and performance requirements, the principle and frame-
work of blockchain should be further studied and designed. In this chapter, we introduced the
basic components of blockchain technology and showed the details of new block generation
process. Both public blockchain and private blockchain are summarized and compared. We
then presented the sidechain technology, including its network structure, two-way peg proto-
col and comparison results with blockchain. After that, we presented several popular areas
where blockchain technology has been applied on. Finally, we mentioned some benefits and
challenges of the blockchain technology. We hope that this comprehensive literature review of
blockchain technology can provide a roadmap for blockchain-based application developments,
and aid researchers in considering directions for valuable research in the future.
Chapter 4
Blockchain-based Distributed Reputation
Management System for IoT Routing
Protection
4.1 Introduction
With the proliferation of IoT devices, many emerging industrial and consumer-related applica-
tions are relying on massive amounts of IoT data on a continuous basis, leading to increasing
requirements on communication and data security [60]. Due to the computational and hardware
related constraints, IoT communication devices and network facilities have many security vul-
nerabilities [61]. Specifically, due to the lack of self-protection mechanisms, many IoT routers
are very vulnerable for malicious cyber-attacks. Thus, routing process protection in IoT net-
works is critical for stringent Quality of Service (QoS) provisioning required by IoT applica-
tions, especially data security and privacy-preservation [62]. A compromised router in an IoT
network could act maliciously by selectively dropping packets and rejecting data forwarding
services. Although existing Reputation Management (RM) systems are useful in identifying
misbehaving routers, the centralized nature of the RM center has the risk of one-point failure.
Several workable existing solutions have been summarized in chapter 2 and they did not
achieve a secure protection for IoT routing. The emerging blockchain technology, with the
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inherent decentralized consensus mechanism, provides a promising method to reduce this one-
point failure risk. Thus, we propose a blockchain-based distributed reputation management
system for routing protection in IoT networks to overcome the abovementioned challenges.
The proposed scheme utilizes the blockchain technique as a decentralized database to store
router reports for calculating reputation of each router. A corresponding reputation calculation
method in IoT environments is developed to evaluate the trustworthy of each router. The pro-
posed scheme also adopts two criteria of evaluating the centrality of routers for misbehaving
router detection. To apply the proposed RM scheme in IoT networks, an efficient group mining
process is designed for reducing the complexity of blockchain technique.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In section 4.2, the adversarial model is first
defined. The proposed blockchain-based distributed RM scheme and efficient group mining
process are then demonstrated in section 4.3. The model analysis is presented in section 4.4.
In section 4.5, the simulation results of the proposed scheme are presented. Finally, the chapter
is concluded in section 4.6.
4.2 System Model
An adversarial blockchain-based reputation management system in IoT system is shown in
Fig. 4.1. In assisting the subsequent analysis, the IoT network system considered in this
chapter consists of four layers, namely, end-user device layer, routing layer, edge server layer
and cloud server layer. The proposed RM model is designed for medium and large routing
networks, and the network should have enough router number to provide routing reports for
each data forwarding service.
The model in Fig. 4.1 illustrates an adversarial routing process in an IoT network, where the
end-user devices try to upload data to the cloud server through the routing layer in the presence
of a malicious router. Specifically, the malicious router attempts to provide the routing service
for the data uploading process with data packet dropping/selfish behavior in order to disrupt
the IoT network. By applying the blockchain technique at the edge layer, the malicious router
can be detected and isolated.
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Figure 4.1: Adversarial blockchain-based reputation management system in IoT networks. The
data link between the users and cloud server suffers from malicious routers.
4.3 Proposed Scheme
4.3.1 Blockchain-based Reputation Management System
Considering the low latency of edge server and the low latency tolerance of reputation manage-
ment, we deploy the proposed blockchain-based RM system at the edge server [63] [64]. The
computational requirements, communication overhead and storage overhead will be analyzed
in the next subsection.
The proposed reputation management scheme consists of the 4 steps as follows:
Distributed Information Collection from Neighboring Routers: When a router helps for-
warding the data packets, its neighboring routers will be required to report to the nearest edge
server for the purpose of reputation management. In achieving this goal, the report will consist
of the report router ID (the router which uploads the report), the reported router ID (the target
router), number of requested packets, and number of forwarded packets.
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Routing Service Evaluation: The reports collected from distributed routers will be viewed
as transactions for the blockchain ledger and will be verified before appending to a new block
in the blockchain. Based on these reports, the packet delivery ratio (PDR) will be calculated
by the edge server based on equation (4.1).
PDR =
Number of forwarded packets
Number of requested packets
(4.1)
By setting a successful delivery ratio threshold, this routing service will be identified as
cooperative or uncooperative. We set 1 to represent for cooperative feedback and -1 for unco-
operative feedback. The transactions will then wait for the block verification process.
Router Reputation Calculation: Once a new block has been verified and added into the
blockchain ledger, the reputation value corresponding to relative routers will be calculated
based on the following formulas. Here we employ centrality value (CV) to indicate the im-
portance of a target router under evaluation to an evaluating router and the whole system. For
instance, the routers which provided a large amount of services or have frequently interacted
with other routers are viewed as central roles with high centrality value in this network. We
defined two kind of centrality values: CV(a, b) is the centrality value of the target router b to
an evaluating router a, which can be used to prevent the malicious routers from building up
many relationships with other routers with high trust; CV(b) is the centrality value of the target
router b to the whole system, which can ensure the reports from central routers weight more
than others.
These two centrality values used in this model can be computed using the following equa-
tion (4.2) and (4.3):
CV(a, b) =
Na,b
Na
, (4.2)
where Na,b is the total number of reports uploaded from router a regarding the previous routing
behavior of router b. Na is the total number of reports that router a has uploaded.
CV(b) =
S r + S s
2 ∗ Nr
, (4.3)
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where S r is the total number of times that router b has been reported when router b is providing
a routing service. S s is the total number of times that router b has acted as a routing evaluator
to report other routers’ behavior to the edge server. Nr is the total number of current received
reports.
When a new report has been appended into the ledger, the reputation value for the asso-
ciated router will be updated. Let Ri(b) represent the reputation value for router b, and the
reputation update function is shown as the following equation (4.4).
Ri(b) =Ri−1(b) + ( f (i) − Ri−1(b)) ∗ Ra ∗ (α ∗CV(a, b) + β ∗CV(b)), (4.4)
where f (i) is the feedback value calculated based on the reporting router a uploaded. Ri−1(b)
is the previous reputation value of the target router b. Ra is the reputation value of evaluating
router a. Both α and β are weight factors to balance these two centrality values.
Misbehaving Router Blacklisting: With the proposed distributed RM scheme, the router’s
reputation value will keep gradually increasing when it acts cooperatively during the routing
process. On the contrary, if the router behaves maliciously, its reputation value will decrease
dramatically. When its reputation value falls below a certain threshold, its router ID will be
blacklisted by the blockchain-based edge server, and the blacklist will be broadcast to the
routing layer to isolate this router.
4.3.2 Efficient Group Mining Process
As previously mentioned in Section 3, Proof of work (PoW) is the most important method of
the blockchain technology, which ensures high security of the decentralized database.
During the PoW mining process, the miners (mining nodes) need to figure out a puzzle for
validating the current block they are working on [44]. The puzzle is shown as following:
HashValue = hash(S HA256, hash(S HA256,M)) (4.5)
4.3. Proposed Scheme 45
and
HashValue ≤ D, (4.6)
where M represents the message of this block, which includes transactions, timestamp, previ-
ous hash, current hash and nonce value. D is the difficulty of creating one block.
The puzzle in equation (4.5) and (4.6) is to find the correct nonce value to make sure that
the final hash is less than the given target D, which is the difficulty for making a new block
[18]. All the blockchain members will work individually to find the correct nonce by inserting
input values one by one starting with 1. It should be noticed that the traditional mining process
is a competition among all miners in the system, and the miner who gets the correct nonce
value first will win the writing access for the blockchain. The winner mining node will add the
new block to the blockchain and update the blockchain to every mining node of the blockchain
system.
:Gateway with high computation 
power
:Gateway with low computation 
power
PoW consensus 
mechanism
Miner 
Group
Miner 
Group
Miner 
Group
Miner 
Group
Miner 
Group
Miner 
Group
Figure 4.2: Model of proposed group mining process, in which edge devices with high com-
putational power will be required to group to edge devices with low computational power.
Due to the limited resources of IoT devices, it is hard to achieve the traditional PoW pro-
cess among IoT devices. In order to fix this issue, we propose an efficient group mining for
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blockchain, which is shown in Fig. 4.2. Instead every miner working on their own block,
all miners will be separated into several groups based on their heterogeneous computational
powers and their locations. The miners with high computational powers will be required to
group with members with low computational powers so that the average computational power
for each group is balanced and the mining competition is fair for each group and device. The
purpose of balancing the computational power is to prevent the 51 percent attack [35]. For
instance, there will not be a case where a powerful mining group can control more than 50%
of computational powers and manipulate the content of the blockchain.
In the proposed group mining process, all mining groups will share the same blockchain
and use the hash of the latest block as a reference to create a new block. Inside each group, a
group leader will be chosen each round, which will lead the group to mine the block each time.
As shown in Fig. 4.3, the group leader will pick transactions from the transaction pool and
generate a genesis block. The genesis block only includes the picked transactions, previous
hash, and leaves the rest elements empty (current hash, timestamp and nonce). This genesis
block will then be multicast within its group so that every group member will have the same
task working on. Each group member will be assigned a certain part of nonce range by the
group leader each time based on their different computational power. The way of calculating
the total nonce value range of a new block is presented in equation (4.7) [65].
n ≤
2256
Hd
, (4.7)
where n is the nonce value range and Hd is the difficulty of creating one block.
Then, starting from the lowest value within their allocated nonce value range, each group
miner will search for the correct nonce value. If the input nonce value does not satisfy the
equation (4.5) and (4.6) after applying the SHA256, the input value will be added by 1 and
re-input. This procedure will continue until the miner finds the correct nonce or reaches the
end of allocated range.
When a mining node in this group succeeds in its mining process, the correct nonce value
will be multicast within the group and all group members will verify the nonce value by check-
ing the SHA values. If the received nonce value is correct, the new block will be multicast to
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Figure 4.3: Flowchart of the proposed group mining process.
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other mining groups and all groups will update the blockchain with the new block. Then, the
one which finds the correct nonce value will be chosen as the new group leader for the next
round, and the rest group leaders will not be replaced. The initialized group leader for each
mining group will be the device with the highest computational power in that group.
4.4 Model Analysis
In this section, we prove the applicability and realizability of the proposed Blockchain-based
RM system by comparing the technical details with existing models and analyzing the system
overhead.
In order to express the benefits of the proposed model, we compare the proposed group
mining blockchain model with the traditional blockchain technology used in Bitcoin system,
and an existing blockchain model mentioned in paper [33].
4.4.1 Technology Comparison
The following Table 4.1 presents the technology comparison results among abovementioned
three blockchain-based models in terms of technical details and security vulnerabilities. As we
can see from the table, the traditional blockchain technology is designed for crypto-currency
and it suffers from double spending attack due to the nature of token-used systems. Whereas,
the existing blockchain model and the proposed model are both non token-used systems and
are aimed to simplify the mining procedure in order to apply in the IoT networks. Compared
with the existing cooperative mining blockchain model, the proposed model in this chapter has
less possibility of suffering from the 51% attack due to the computational powers balance rule
of the group mining process. Moreover, it has a more efficient mining task allocation scheme
to ensure the efficiency of block generation. Therefore, the proposed blockchain model shows
its superiority in efficient mining process and attack defense ability compared with other two
models.
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Table 4.1: Comparison Results Between The Traditional Blockchain Technology, Existing
Blockchain Model and the Proposed Blockchain Model.
Traditional Blockchain
Technology in
Bitcoin System
Existing Blockchain
Technology in
IoT Networks
Proposed Blockchain
Technology in
This Chapter
Member
Permissions
Public Blockchain
(Every entity can
read and write)
Private Blockchain
(Only mining nodes
can read and write)
Private Blockchain
(Only mining nodes
can read and write)
Transaction
Content
Crypto-currency Collected data Collected data
Transaction
Relationship
Continuously;
Related
Independent;
Unrelated
Independent;
Unrelated
Consensus
Mechanism
PoW
Cooperative Mining
Pow Process
Group Mining
PoW Process
Reward to
Mining Nodes
When Succeed
in Mining
Certain mining
fees will be
paid to miners
No
The mining node
will be chosen
as the group lead
of the mining group
Double
Spending Attack
Yes No No
51% Attack Less possible High possible Less possible
4.4.2 Overhead Analysis
In this section, the overhead analysis of the proposed blockchain-based RM system has been
studied from three aspects: computation requirements, communication overhead and storage
overhead.
4.4.2.1 Computation Requirements
In the proposed work, most of the computation is required at the mining node for 1) mining
process; 2) reputation calculation for each router. For the mining process, we conduct the
blockchain onto the edge server for faster transaction verification speed and higher throughput
of data. More importantly, following the group mining rule, we set mining nodes into groups to
mine a same block for reducing the computational overhead at each node. Thus, the computa-
tional overhead should not be a factor limiting the application of the proposed blockchain-based
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RM model. In order to detect the malicious routers in the network, the reputation of router is
periodically calculated and updated. The traditional indirect/direct evaluation mentioned in
[26] [27] is computationally expensive at each device and will limit the applicability of the
RM systems. Thus, we propose a lightweight algorithm to evaluate the trustworthy of the IoT
routers from a global view to reduce the computation overhead caused by individual evalua-
tion. The algorithm utilizes two categories of router centrality as the criteria for the evaluation,
and its detection performance is presented in Section 4.5.2.1.
4.4.2.2 Communication Overhead
After analyzing the computation requirements in the previous subsection, we now investigate
the communication overhead (CO) for the blockchain-based RM model. As we previously
mentioned in Chapter 3 about the blockchain technology, each information packet transmitted
to the blockchain includes a transaction (a routing report in our case) and a corresponding
signature signed by the private key of the source node. Thus, the total communication overhead
of a routing packet P transmitted to the edge device server is given as follows:
COtotal(P) = COReport(P) + COS ignature(P), (4.8)
where COReport(P) is the communication overhead caused by the transmitted routing report and
COS ignature(P) is the communication overhead caused by its corresponding signature.
As mentioned in Section 4.3, a routing report contains a report router ID, a reported router
ID, the number of requested packets and the number of forwarded packets. The average size of
a routing report is calculated as 36 bytes [66]. Since we use a 32-bit modulus for the signature
in the SHA 256 encryption, the size for a signature is 4 bytes. So, for each transmitted packet,
the per-hop communication overhead of the packet transmission in the proposed RM system
is 36 + 4 = 40 bytes. For a path of H intermediate hops, the total communication overhead
for all transmitting routing reports is 40H bytes. For a case with 10 intermediate hops, the
total communication overhead at the edge server side is 400 bytes/packet. For an IEEE 802.11
system, this is about 17.36% of the maximum MSDU (2,304 bytes). Therefore, the proposed
RM system will not be limited by the communication overhead caused by routing reports.
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4.4.2.3 Storage Overhead
As mentioned in Chapter 3, each mining node is required to store its own private key, the public
keys of all the entities, and the blockchain information. In the proposed blockchain-based RM
system, we use 32-byte private key and 32-byte public key for each router. Therefore, for a
routing network with N routers, each edge mining device should have 32N + 64 bytes for the
key storage.
In order to calculate the storage size of the blockchain information, the size for each block
component of a blockchain is summarized in Table 4.2 [67][68].
Table 4.2: Memory Size for Each Block Component of a Blockchain.
Blockchain Component Size (bytes)
Previous Block Hash 32
Transaction 36
Time stamp 4
Nonce 4
Current Block Hash 32
Rest of a Block (Transaction Counter, Difficult Target) 12
Block Counter 4
Since SHA 256 can encrypt any size plaintext/transaction into a fixed size 256-bit crypto-
graphic hash, the size for hash value of a block is always 256 bits/ 32 bytes [67]. In the bitcoin
blockchain, the average transaction size is assumed to be 400 bytes [69]. Whereas, in our IoT
scenario, the transaction is the routing reports, which is set to be 36 bytes per report. Thus, for
a blockchain network with B blocks (blockchain size) and D transactions in each block (block
size), the size of the blockchain is (84+36D)B+4 bytes. For example, for a network with 1000
devices, the blockchain size is 1000 and average block size is 10, the total storage overhead
would be [(84 + 36 ∗ 10) ∗ 1000 + 4] + (32 ∗ 1000 + 64) = 476068 bytes, which is 464.91 KB.
For edge device server, the average storage capacity of each device is assumed to be 100 GB
[70]. Thus, the storage overhead cased by the proposed blockchain-based RM is affordable as
it costs approximately 0.000443% of the storage size of the edge device.
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4.5 Performance Evaluation
This section evaluates the performance of the proposed blockchain-based RM system in terms
of 1) attacks detection performance, 2) RM system convergence performance and 3) robustness
and efficiency performance.
4.5.1 Simulation Settings
We carry out our simulation experiments in MATLAB. We simulate 50 routers for evalu-
ating the performance of attacks detection and RM system convergence performance. The
routers number chosen here could provide enough routing reports for the reputation calcula-
tion scheme, and we compare our model with three existing RM models. Then, we further
test the RM convergence performance against different network sizes. In order to evaluate the
blockchain efficiency compared with existing works, 100 routers are simulated.
Table 4.3: System Settings Comparison and Parameter Settings.
Traditional
Blockchain
Voting
Blockchain
Group Mining
Blockchain
Mining Members All nodes Cluster head nodes Edge devices
Percentage of Miners 100% 20% 20%
Mining Groups No No Four groups
Voted Transaction
before Mining
No All nodes vote All edge devices
Hash Value Verification
Happens during
block verification
Happens during
block verification
Happens within
mining group
New Block
Verification
All nodes All miners
Same group
miners
Broadcasting
New Block
To all nodes To all miners
To other
mining groups
CPU Frequency
of IoT Nodes(GHZ)
Between 1
to 2.8
CH nodes:
2 to 2.8
Other nodes:
1 to 2
Edge devices:
2 to 2.8
Other nodes:
1 to 2
All routers are classified into two types, i.e. normal routers and malicious routers. Normal
routers will cooperate during the routing process and will be accepted by the system while still
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under monitoring by the RM system. In contrast, malicious routers provide ineffective routing
process and will be eventually isolated by RM based on their malicious behaviors detected.
All the experimental results are averaged over 30 runs and initialized reputation values for all
routers are set to be 0.5. The experimental parameters for analyzing the blockchain efficiency
are summarized in Table 4.3.
Since different IoT nodes have different computational powers to process the transactions,
we need to set different CPU frequency for high computational nodes and low computational
nodes in order to evaluate the performance of block generating process. The CPU frequencies
of mining nodes are set between [2GHZ, 2.8GHZ], and CPU frequencies of the rest of nodes
are between [1GHZ, 2GHZ] [71]. We assume that each routing report (blockchain transaction)
is 36 bytes, 100 cycles per byte for each nodes and 5 transactions for each block (block size).
4.5.2 Analysis of Experimental Results
4.5.2.1 Attack Detection Performance
In the first experiment, we focus on analyzing the performance of attack detection. We have
studied mainly two types of routing misbehaviors, namely packet dropping and selfish behav-
ior.
Packet dropping attacks interfere the IoT routing process by selectively dropping packets in
order to increase the packet loss rate, It is a common router’s malicious behavior, but it is hard
to detect and control in the IoT system. In the first test, we simulate the packet dropping attacks
in routing process, and the results are shown in Fig. 4.4. In the test, We use four routers with
different levels of packet loss frequency to show the performance of the proposed blockchain-
based RM system in terms of malicious routers detection. For the first 10 transactions, we set all
routers as general routers in order to gain routing histories from other routers for initialization.
Then, their malicious behaviors start during the following 30 transactions. We can observe
from Fig. 4.4 that the router with zero packet dropping attack frequency gains trusts from
others, and its reputation increases steadily and slowly. On the contrary, for those routers with
packet dropping behaviors, their reputation values decline continuously. When their reputation
values are less than the certain threshold, the routers will be identified as the malicious routers
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Figure 4.4: Packet dropping attacks detection for different malicious levels.
by the proposed RM management system. As a result, their device IDs will be put onto the
blacklist and isolated from other routers.
Selfish router, as a common type of malicious misbehaving router, keeps refusing packets
delivery in order to break down the network and save its own energy. We also simulate the
selfish behavior attacks in our system, and the results are shown in Fig. 4.5. We use three
routers with different malicious levels to show the performance of the proposed RM system.
For the first 10 transactions, we set them all as general routers for gaining reputation purpose.
In the next 30 transactions, their reputation values will be affected by their malicious routing
behaviors. For instance, the one with 100% selfish behavior loses its reputation soon and
gets isolated from the network. The router with 50% selfish behavior is set to be the on-off
attack, which impacts the network by alternatively providing good and bad services in order to
cover its damage to the network. By using the proposed RM system, the on-off attack could
also be efficiently detected. As shown in the figure, this router has experienced a continuous
declination until it reached the bottom threshold and got isolated. The one with 0% packet
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Figure 4.5: Selfish behavior detection for different malicious levels.
dropping attack frequency is a general router and its reputation experienced a slow increase.
4.5.2.2 System Convergence Performance
This subsection demonstrates the performance of the proposed distributed blockchain-based
RM model by presenting the system convergence analysis. In IoT networks, the reputation
value of each router is hard to manage with the number of malicious routers dramatically
increasing and the size of this network significantly increasing. Thus, we analyze the conver-
gence performance of the proposed blockchain-based RM system from two aspects: malicious
level and network size.
Convergence Performance With Different Malicious Levels: In this test, we focus on the
convergence analysis of the proposed RM system with different malicious levels. We use 50
IoT nodes as the network size. For evaluation criterion, we use the number of malicious routers
left in the network.
Fig. 4.6 depicts the convergence performance of the proposed RM with different malicious
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Figure 4.6: Convergence of the proposed reputation system for different malicious levels.
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Figure 4.7: Convergence of the proposed reputation system for different network sizes.
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routers percentage: 10%, 30% and 50%. As we can observe from the figure, with the increase
of transactions, all the malicious routers have been detected and isolated from the system for
these three cases. The RM system converges at respectively 224th, 252nd and 280th transac-
tion for 10%, 30% and 50% malicious routers cases. The result illustrates that the proposed
BC-based RM model converges with different malicious as the all the malicious routers are
identified and isolated.
Convergence Performance With Different Network Sizes: The second test evaluates the
convergence performance of the proposed RM system with different network sizes. We set
25 malicious routers in each network in order to control the impact of different number of
misbehaving routers. Fig. 4.7 shows the convergence performance of the proposed RM system
with different network sizes (N= 50, 100, 200, 400). The system converges to 0 at respectively
265th, 353rd, 617th and 761st transaction for N= 50, 100, 200, 400. This figure suggests that the
proposed blockchain-based RM system has a strong scale capacity for monitoring the routing
behaviors in IoT networks.
However, the convergence performance could be challenged when the size of the IoT net-
work becomes excessively high due to the large memory size requirement in RM system.
4.5.2.3 Robustness and Efficiency Performance
In this subsection, we analyze the robustness and efficiency performance of the proposed
blockchain-based RM system.
Robust Performance: For evaluate the robust performance of the system, two criteria have
been tested, namely, global reputation value performance and successful transaction rate.
In the first experiment, we consider the global reputation performance of the system. We
compute global average reputation value as the evaluation criterion against different malicious
percentage scenarios. We perform a total of 1000 transactions and test the performance with
three malicious levels: 10% malicious routers, 30% malicious routers and 50% malicious
routers. As shown in Fig. 4.8, the global average reputation value drops in the beginning due
to the malicious routers’ behaviors when the total transactions number is less than 100. After
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Figure 4.8: Global reputation value performance detection for different malicious levels.
that, the average reputation value of the system starts to recover. The reason of the recover is
that the blacklist removes the malicious routers with low reputation values from the system. At
the 1000th transaction, the average global reputation valves are respectively 0.7482, 0.8477 and
0.9589 for 10% malicious routers, 30% malicious routers and 50% malicious routers. Thus,
with using the proposed distributed blockchain-based RM system, the whole system can be
optimized by removing misbehaving routers.
In the second experiment, we compute the Successful Transaction Rate (STR) as the evalu-
ation criterion in order to test the robust performance of the proposed RM model. We perform a
total of 1000 transactions and take the average result for 30 experiments. Transactions initiated
by malicious routers have been discarded from the calculation of STR. The following equation
(4.9) shows the STR calculation.
S TR =
Number of Successful Transaction
Totoal Number of Transaction
(4.9)
In this test, we compare the proposed model with FCTrust [72], SFTrust [73], and Dynamic
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Figure 4.9: Comparing the proposed RM system with other existing trust models in terms of
average STR against malicious percentage.
trust model for Muti-agent systems (for short we will use DTrust) [74]. As we observe from
the Fig. 4.9, the proposed BC-based RM model shows its superiority over the remaining trust
models in maintaining successful transactions as the percentage of malicious routers increases.
Only until the percentage of malicious routers reaches more than 80%, the average STR then
starts to decease sharply, due to the lack of trusted routers existed in the network. Whereas,
the turning point for FCTrust, SFTrust and DTrust are approximately 35%, 55% and 60%.
The figure proves that the presented blockchain-based RM model could not only hold back
malicious routers from data forwarding, but also ensure a higher successful transaction rate for
maintaining the operation of the system.
Blockchain Efficiency: In this subsection, we mainly analyze the proposed group mining
blockchain efficiency in order to prove the rationality of applying blockchain technology. In the
experiment, we mainly test the efficiency enhancement of the proposed group mining scheme
compared with the traditional blockchain mining technology and existing mining method.
60Chapter 4. Blockchain-basedDistributedReputationManagement System for IoT Routing Protection
To evaluate the efficiency, we use the processing time of generating one block as the mea-
surement criterion for the simulation. Specifically, the processing time of a new block gener-
ation is consisting of the process of new block generating, the process of verifying the trans-
actions and hash values, mining process and the time of broadcasting the new block to other
blockchain members. The traditional blockchain technology, cooperative mining blockchain
proposed in [33] and voting blockchain proposed in [44] are simulated for comparing with the
proposed group mining model.
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Figure 4.10: Comparison results of our blockchain model with other existing blockchain mod-
els in terms of processing time for creating one new block.
Fig. 4.10 compares the proposed group mining model with the traditional blockchain tech-
nology, the cooperative mining blockchain and the voting blockchain in terms of processing
time of mining a new block. For the traditional blockchain, the processing time is the longest
among these four due to the high consumption of the traditional PoW. For the cooperative
mining blockchain, the processing time is less than the traditional one because the cooperative
mining process simplifies the PoW process by allocate the mining tasks to different mining de-
vices group. However, the efficiency performance is not well improved and the whole system
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is under the threat of 51% attack. For the voting blockchain, when the number of IoT nodes
in the network is less, this method significantly reduce the processing time of a new block
generation for the reason that the number of nodes required to vote for each transaction is less
enough. Thus, the total processing time is close to the performance of the proposed group
mining model. However, with the number of nodes increasing, the number of voting nodes are
getting enormous, and the processing time is required more than the proposed model. For the
proposed efficient group mining process, with the number of routers increasing, it shows high
efficiency improvement compared with other three models because of the efficient grouping
mechanism and specific verification process among the mining group members.
Overall, our method substantially decreases the processing time compared with the tradi-
tional blockchain. cooperative mining blockchain and the voting blockchain. With the increas-
ing number of IoT nodes, it shows more advantages in the processing time of new block gener-
ation while keeps the security level of the PoW technique. It should be noted that the proposed
group mining process presented in this chapter could also be employed in other blockchain-
based systems in order to achieve the goal of simplifying blockchain technology.
4.6 Chapter Summary
With the rapid proliferation of Internet of Thing (IoT) devices, many security challenges could
be introduced at low-end routers. Misbehaving routers affect the availability of the networks by
dropping packets selectively and rejecting data forwarding services. Although existing Reputa-
tion Management (RM) systems are useful in identifying misbehaving routers, the centralized
nature of the RM center has the risk of one-point failure. The emerging blockchain techniques,
with the inherent decentralized consensus mechanism, provide a promising method to reduce
this one-point failure risk. In this chapter, we proposed a blockchain-based reputation man-
agement system for routing process protection in IoT networks. By applying the blockchain
technique onto the edge server, the proposed distributed reputation management system can
effectively handle the reputation value of each router in the system. A global reputation man-
agement scheme was presented to determine the reputation value for each router. To improve
the implement efficiency of blockchain, we also proposed an efficient group mining technique
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for the blockchain. The overhead of the proposed work has been investigated. Simulation
results validate the distributed blockchain-based RM system in terms of attacks detection, sys-
tem convergence performance, and robustness and efficiency performance. The comparison
results of the proposed group mining process with existing blockchain models illustrate the
applicability and feasibility of the proposed works.
Chapter 5
A Sidechain-based Decentralized
Authentication Scheme via Optimized
Two-way Peg Protocol for Smart
Community
5.1 Introduction
IoT smart community is an IoT application scenario where different IoT systems are combined,
such as smart homes, smart health, and smart agriculture. In smart community, personal data
are collected and processed in each system by smart devices, and then get shared with other
systems [8]. In order to ensure the security of personal information, it is fundamental to make
sure that only the registered and authenticated devices can make use of the system and share
information. Otherwise, it will result in numerous potential security risks such as information
stealing, data tampering and identity usurpation [36]. Local authentication process in each
smart system and sharing authentication information within sub-systems remain the major ob-
stacle for privacy protection in IoT smart community due to imperfect mechanisms and the
resource-constrained nature of IoT devices [37].
As previously mentioned in Chapter 2, the existing architectures in IoT smart community
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suffer from low device authentication efficiency, authentication methods uniformity, and cen-
tralized sharing server. In order to overcome these challenges and limitations, we propose a
novel sidechain structure with an optimized two-way peg protocol for the device authentication
in smart community, with an emphasis on establishing a decentralized structure for local au-
thentication process and realizing information sharing with other systems, as well as achieving
minimal time and storage consumption at constrained IoT devices. The proposed sidechain
model utilizes a public mainchain as a reference chain to keep a local information record, and
private side blockchains to manage the local authentication process in each system. We also
come up with the optimized two-way peg protocol for sidechain system to realize a secured
information sharing procedure between the main chain and side blockchains, by dynamically
evaluating the trustworthy of the target device. Both PoW and Simplified Payment Verification
(SPV) has been reached as consensus mechanisms for blocks generation and efficient informa-
tion tracking purposes [50] [75].
This chapter is organized as follows. In section 5.2, the proposed decentralized sidechain-
based authentication scheme with optimized two-way peg protocol is demonstrated. In section
5.3, technology comparison results are given among the proposed sidechain model and other
existing methods. In section 5.4, the simulation results are presented and analyzed. Finally,
this chapter is concluded in section 5.5.
5.2 System Model
Fig. 5.1 presents the proposed sidechain-based authentication model in a smart community,
which is composed of a public blockchain as a mainchain and private blockchains as side
blockchains. To illustrate the model, we use two smart home cases to represent the IoT smart
systems. In each smart system, central mining nodes are chosen among local smart devices
based on their computational abilities and locations. The private blockchain is built among the
central mining nodes and gateway in order to securely manage the authentication processes
with the distributed PoW consensus mechanism. Among all the gateways in this smart com-
munity, a public mainchain is employed to securely manage the authentication information
sharing process with implementing the optimized two-way peg protocol. In order to reduce
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Figure 5.1: Proposed sidechain-based authentication model. The proposed model consists of a
public mainchain and private side blockchains.
the storage consumption at the gateway level, each mainchain block will only be saved at local
gateway after the verification process without updating an entire mainchain.
5.2.1 Local Authentication Procedure at Private Side Blockchains
In this section, we mainly illustrate the implementation procedure of authentication process at
each private side blockchain. We divide the procedure into two phases: Registration phase and
Authentication phase. In the Registration phase, the authentication information will be viewed
as the transactions and uploaded to the local private side blockchain to form a block. In the
Authentication phase, the authentication parameters saved in the block will be extracted and
compared with the received parameters to decide if the device has been successfully authenti-
cated or not.
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5.2.1.1 Registration Phase
When a new IoT device is firstly added to a smart system, the device should be registered by
the corresponding private side blockchain in this system.
Firstly, the device sends its ID to the gateway, and its ID will be searched in the public main-
chain to see if it is newly registered. If there is previous authentication information existed in
other smart systems, the gateway will send a request to the public mainchain for authentication
information sharing process. Otherwise, the local registration process will start.
Block n
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3) Authentication parameters 
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Current Hash
Block n+1
Previous Hash
Transactions:
1) Device ID
2) Authentication method
3) Authentication parameters 
Timestamp
Nonce
Current Hash
Block n-1
Previous Hash
Transactions:
1) Device ID
2) Authentication method
3) Authentication parameters 
Timestamp
Nonce
Current Hash
Figure 5.2: Structure and content of the private side blockchain.
The local registration process is achieved by creating a new block into the private side
blockchain. Fig. 5.2 shows the structure of a block in the private side blockchain, which
consists of the header information (previous hash and current hash, time stamp and nonce
value) and transactions. By adopting the PoW consensus mechanism, a trusted relationship
among all the central mining nodes will be established. The data saved in the blockchain cannot
be changed or manipulated. In our model, the authentication information of each device will
be saved as three transactions into one block, which contains the following components: (1)
device ID; (2) authentication method; (3) corresponding authentication keys or parameters. The
authentication method can be various based on the devices’ computational powers and usage
scenarios. Except of the device ID for the tracking purpose, all transactions are encrypted by
using Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA) 256 with the device’s private key [75].
When a new device has been successfully registered, the devices ID and its block number
will be uploaded along with the corresponding smart system ID to the public mainchain to
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form a reference records for the authentication information sharing procedure, which we will
mention in the next Section 5.2.2.
5.2.1.2 Authentication Phase
Header
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Step 3: Decrypt the authentication 
information with its public key.
Step 4: Compare authentication 
parameter.
Step 5: Response the device.
Figure 5.3: Procedure of the proposed authentication process at private side blockchain.
When a smart device wants to establish a communication session within the smart system
for data uploading or downloading after the registration process, the authentication process will
be required.
Fig. 5.3 displays the procedure of the proposed authentication process. First, a request that
contains the device’s ID and authentication parameters will be sent to the nearest central mining
node. Secondly, the central mining node downloads the corresponding block from the private
side blockchain relying on the device ID. Then, after decrypting the block with the public key
of the device, the central mining node will compare the decrypted authentication parameters
with the received parameters. Finally, a response will be sent to the device to inform whether
it is successfully authenticated.
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Since the device authentication process is achieved at the nearest central mining node in-
stead of the gateway device, the communication burden of the gateway has been significantly
decreased.
5.2.2 Authentication Information Sharing at Public Mainchain
The IoT device with mobility features can move from one smart system to another system,
such as drones and community service robots. If this device requires to get access to the data
in the new system,it should be authenticated by the system. However, if there is no previous
authentication information block existed in the system (side blockchains), the device would
be required to repeatedly register in the new system, which will cost large amounts of energy
and time. Therefore, authentication information should be able to be shared within a smart
community.
... ...
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Smart system A 
(Information Requester)
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1)Send information 
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Figure 5.4: Model of authentication information sharing at the public mainchain. Both PoW
consensus mechanism and the proposed optimized two-way peg protocol have been applied for
safe operation of the proposed sidechain-based smart community system.
Although a device can be successfully registered by one system, it still has a risk of being
compromised later on to become a malicious device, and its authentication information can no
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longer be used by other systems. The original two-way peg protocol is designed to defend the
financial sidechain systems from an unique business attack which is double spending attack, but
it cannot prevent the risk in our presented scenario. Thus, we propose an optimized two-way
peg protocol to guarantee the trustworthy of the shared information in the information sharing
procedure by dynamically calculating the trust value of the target device. Fig. 5.4 demonstrates
the procedure of the proposed authentication information sharing procedure guaranteed by the
optimized two-way peg protocol. The procedure mainly consists of the 4 steps as follows:
Information Source Tracking: When an IoT device firstly registers in a smart system, the
corresponding gateway will send a tracking request along with the device ID to the mainchain
in order to check if there is previous authentication information of this device. When the
public mainchain receives the request from the information requester (smart system A), the
corresponding block that contains the information resources (including smart system ID and
block number) will be tracked based on the device ID.
SPV Proof Collection: For those smart systems with required information, an SPV proof
(device ID, device ID list, block header list) is required to send to smart system A in order
to prove the existence of the target information without downloading the full chain. Then, the
gateway of smart system A will do the SPV verification. However, offloading the SPV verifica-
tion task to a single node (gateway) is a security concern for the smart system since a malicious
gateway could deceive the system by responding with adulterated outcomes. Therefore, the
local center mining nodes will be required to handle the verification voting process with local
gateway. Only more than half of them successfully verify the SPV proof will the result be
proved.
Trustworthy Evaluation: Based on the SPV proofs, the current trust value of this device
will be calculated and get compared with the trust threshold of the smart system A. Only when
the gateway provides the positive result will the information be shared with the information
requester. Otherwise, the device will be reported to be manually registered in order to protect
the security of the smart community.
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For the trust value calculation rule, we mainly consider three aspects a device: authenti-
cation method evaluation, information sharing history evaluation and authentication process
evaluation. We set the whole range of trust value in [0-1], and each IoT smart system can have
different acceptance threshold to filtrate the untrustworthy devices.
Tmeth represents the trust value for using different authentication methods. The harder the
authentication method is, the higher Tmeth it gets. The reason is that we assume the harder au-
thentication method can provide a higher security performance, and we set that each device can
pick one authentication method depending on its computational powers and its usage scenario.
For example, we set 0.4 for using PSK authentication method and 0.5 for using certificates
authentication method.
The following two equations express the calculation process for information sharing history
evaluation and authentication process evaluation.
Tsharing =
αi
Nsys ∗ Mthre
Nuse∑
i=1
Tthre, (5.1)
where Tsharing(i) is the trust value of information sharing for this device. Nsys is the total number
of IoT smart systems in this smart community. Mthre is the average trust threshold of the whole
smart community. Nuse is the number of smart systems that currently have the authentication
information of this device. Tthre is the corresponding trust threshold of the smart system. αi is
decay factor.
Tauthen = β
Nsucc∑
i=1
Tthre − γ
Nunsucc∑
i=1
Tthre, (5.2)
where Tauthen(i) is the trust value of authentication process for this device. Nsucc is the total num-
ber of successful authentication process in the smart community, and Nunsucc is the total number
of unsuccessful authentication process in this smart community. Tthre is the corresponding trust
threshold of each smart system. Both β and γ are weight factors.
By combining these three trust value components, the trustworthy of a device can be dy-
namically calculated as in equation (5.3).
Td = λ ∗ Tmeth + µ ∗ Tsharing + ν ∗ Tauthen, (5.3)
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where Tmeth, Tsharing and Tauthen are in [0-1]. λ, µ and ν are weight factors, and λ + µ + ν = 1.
Information Sharing: When the trust value of this device meets the threshold of smart sys-
tem requester, the required authentication information will be allowed to get shared. The de-
crypted required information will be uploaded to the public mainchain from the nearest infor-
mation holder (smart system B) to form a new block by using the PoW consensus mechanism.
Then, the information will be encrypted with the public key of smart system A so that only the
information requester can read and download the content of the block with its own private key.
It should be noted that the optimized two-way peg protocol presented in this chapter could also
be employed in other sidechain-based IoT systems to ensure the trustworthy of the required
information.
5.3 Technology Comparison
In order to illustrate the technical advantages of the proposed sidechain model, we compare the
proposed sidechain model with traditional blockchain technology used in bitcoin system, and
the traditional sidechain technology used for crypto-currency transferring.
The Table 5.1 presents the comparison results of these three technologies in terms of techni-
cal details and security capability. As we can obtain from the table, both blockchain technology
and traditional sidechain technology have the risk of being threatened by double spending at-
tack and worthless information attack. Whereas, the proposed sidechain technology in the
smart community is a non token-used system and it does not suffer from double spending
attack. Moreover, the proposed optimized two-way peg protocol protect the system from the
worthless information attack during the information sharing procedure among side blockchains
and mainchain.
5.4 Simulation Experiment and Result Analysis
In this section, we evaluate the proposed sidechain-based device authentication scheme in terms
of the authentication time consumption, the optimized two-way peg protocol performance,
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Table 5.1: The Technology Comparison Between the Traditional Blockchain Technology, the
Traditional Sidechain Technology and the Proposed Sidechain Model.
Blockchain Technology
in Bitcoin System
Sidechain Technology
for Crypto-currency
Transferring
Proposed Sidechain
in This Chapter
Member
Permissions
Public Blockchain;
(Every entity can
read and write)
Public mainchain
and public side blockchains
Public blockchain
and Private side blockchains
Transaction
Content
Crypto-currency Crypto-currency Collected data
Transaction
Relationship
Continuously,
Related
Continuously,
Related
Independent,
Unrelated
Consensus
Mechanism
PoW Pow and SPV PoW and SPV
Protocol for
Transferring
Information
No
Two-way
peg protocol
Optimized two-way
peg protocol
Double
Spending
Attack
Yes Yes No
Worthless
Information
Attack
Yes Yes No
information management efficiency and storage consumption.
5.4.1 Authentication Time Consumption Analysis
As previously mentioned in Chapter 2, a blockchain-based method has been proposed to dis-
tributively manage the local authentication process and information sharing process [43]. The
authentication information has been viewed as transaction saved in blockchain and can be
shared within the community. However, this structure increases the burden of gateways by
treating them as central devices to handle the local authentication procedure and saving au-
thentication information from other systems. In this experiment, we compare the proposed
sidechain-based method with the blockchain-based method and conventional authentication
without any additional method in terms of authentication time consumption.
5.4. Simulation Experiment and Result Analysis 73
5.4.1.1 Simulation Settings
We simulate an authentication process between a gateway that hosts the blockchain/sidechain
and a smart device in MATLAB. Table 5.2 describes the environment features of the simula-
tion. We test the authentication time consumption by comparing these three methods: (1) the
conventional authentication process without applying any additional method; (2) the authenti-
cation process with using the proposed sidechain-based method; (3) the authentication process
with using the blockchain-based method. We use PSK as the authentication method for this
experiment. The experimental results are averaged over 30 runs.
Table 5.2: Environment Features of Authentication Process.
CPU Processor OperatingSystem
CPU Max
Speed
Computing
Environment
x64
64-bit Microsoft
Windows 10
2.6 GHz MATLAB
5.4.1.2 Authentication Time Consumption Against PSK Character Lengths
For the first test, we evaluate the effect of PSK character lengths to the authentication time
consumption. We simulate a smart community with 10 smart systems and each system have
10 smart devices. Fig. 5.5 presents the authentication time comparison results of using three
abovementioned methods with different PSK character lengths. Although the conventional
method without any additional method realizes the lowest authentication time among three
methods, it has lowest functionality and security enhancement performance. For 12 chars PSK,
the authentication time for the blockchain-based method is 0.0054 seconds, and 0.0046 seconds
for the proposed sidechain-based method. With increasing the number of characters in PSK,
the average authentication times for the conventional method, the proposed sidechain-based
method and blockchain-based method are respectively 1) 0.0053 seconds, 0.0076 seconds and
0.0088 seconds when PSK has 24 characters; 2) 0.0098 seconds, 0.0133 seconds and 0.0153
seconds when PSK has 24 characters.
As we can observe from that the proposed sidechain-based method shows its superior-
ity in reducing authentication time compared with the blockchain-based method, with saving
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Figure 5.5: Authentication time comparison among three methods with different PSK character
lengths.
33.33%, 34.29% and 36.36% of the additional cost on authentication time caused by using
blockchain structure for these three cases. As the character length of PSK increases, the pro-
posed sidechain-based method shows more advantages in decreasing authentication time com-
pared with the method in [43]. The reason is that the complexity of searching the target device
ID in the block has increased with the number of PSK increases. With using the proposed
sidechain, the offload of public mainchain could be noticeably reduced compared with the
existing blockchain-based method.
5.4.1.3 Authentication Time Consumption Against Blockchain Parameters
Considering the position of the block that owns the authentication parameters and the blockchain
length may induce to an additional time cost, we focus on analyzing the influence of blockchain
parameters to the authentication time results in the second test.
We simulate the blockchain/sidechain with 100 blocks and 200 blocks, and use 12 chars
PSK as the authentication method for this experiment. We compare three block positions
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for each block length scenario: (1) the authentication parameters are in the first block of the
blockchain, presented as BF; (2) the authentication parameters are in the middle block of the
blockchain, presented as BM; and (3) the authentication parameters are in the last block of the
blockchain, BE.
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Figure 5.6: Authentication time comparison of three block positions with different blockchain
lengths.
Fig. 5.6 exhibits the authentication time comparison results of three abovementioned block
positions with different blockchain lengths. For the 100 block length scenario, the authen-
tication times for blockchain-based model are 0.0044 seconds, 0.0049 seconds and 0.0055
seconds, respectively for the scenarios BF ,BM and BE. Whereas, the authentication times for
the proposed sidechain model are 0.0044 seconds,0.0045 seconds and 0.0047, respectively for
these three block positions. It can be concluded that the proposed sidechain-based authen-
tication model could decrease the additional implementation time caused by block positions
compared with the existing blockchain-based authentication model. Take BE for 100 blocks
as an example, it decrease 0.0008 seconds. which is 14.55% of the total time consumption
of blockchain-based model. For the 200 block length scenario. the authentication time for
76Chapter 5. A Sidechain-basedDecentralizedAuthentication Scheme viaOptimized Two-way Peg Protocol for SmartCommunity
blockchain-based model are 0.0044 seconds, 0.0055 seconds and 0.0067 seconds for these
three positions, while 0.0044 seconds, 0.0048 seconds and 0.0053 seconds for the sidechain-
based model. The proposed sidechain-based model saves 0.0014 seconds at the last blockchain
position compared with blockchain-based method, which is 20.90% of the total time consump-
tion of blockchain-based model. Therefore, as the number of block increase, the proposed
sidechain model show its benefit in reducing the complexity of information searching com-
pared with blockchain model.
5.4.2 Performance Analysis of the Proposed Optimized Two-way Peg Pro-
tocol
In this experiment, we evaluate the proposed optimized two-way peg protocol in the simulated
sidechain system.
5.4.2.1 Simulation Settings
Table 5.3: Parameter Configurations for Testing the Proposed Trust Scheme.
Number of
Smart Systems
(Nsys)
Acceptance
Trust Threshold
(Tthre)
Registered
Systems
(Nsucc)
Systems with
Low Trust Threshold
60 [0.30-0.50] 10
Systems with
High Trust Threshold
40 [0.50-0.70] 5
We simulate a smart community with 100 smart systems and record the trust value of smart
devices with different malicious behavior percentage. The parameter configurations for testing
the proposed optimized two-way peg protocol are listed in Table 5.3. The experimental results
are averaged over 30 runs.
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Figure 5.7: Performance evaluation for optimized two-way peg protocol with using certificates
as the authentication method.
5.4.2.2 Optimized Two-way Peg Protocol Performance
We use certificates method as the authentication method to show the performance of the pro-
posed protocol. In this experiment, we test the performance of the trust evaluation scheme with
three malicious levels: 20% unsuccessful authentication rate, 10% unsuccessful authentication
rate and 0% unsuccessful authentication. As shown in Fig. 5.7, the device with 0% unsuc-
cessful authentication rate continuously gains trust values by its successful behaviors, and its
average trust value increases steadily and slowly. Its authentication information can be allowed
to be shared with other smart systems through the public mainchain as long as it can provide
the proof that its trust value is higher than the trust threshold of a target smart system. As
previously mentioned, the trust value of this device with no malicious behavior approximately
stays 0.70, which can meet the requirements of most smart systems with high trust threshold
([0.50-0.70]) and all the smart systems with low trust threshold ([0.30-0.50]). On the contrary,
for the devices with 10% unsuccessful authentication rate, its trust value will decline continu-
ously. After 412nd authentication, its authentication information can no longer be shared in the
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smart systems with high trust threshold. Then, after 964th authentication, its information will
not be allowed to be shared in the smart community. For the devices with 20% unsuccessful
authentication rate, its trust value will decline sharply. Its authentication information cannot
be shared with smart systems with high trust threshold at 221st authentication. After 438th
authentication, its information will not be allowed to be shared in the smart community.
When the trust value is less than the threshold of the target IoT system, the authentication
information cannot be shared with other smart systems in order to protect the information
security of the community.
5.4.3 Performance Analysis of the Information Management Efficiency
Due to the low computational power of constrained IoT smart device, one of the most im-
portant requirements for the proposed sidechain-based authentication method is to decrease
the computational overhead cased by managing the authentication information at the gateway
side. Thus, this subsection mainly demonstrates the comparison results between the proposed
sidechain-based method, the traditional sidechain method and the blockchain-based method
mentioned in terms of information management efficiency.
5.4.3.1 Simulation Settings
Table 5.4: Parameter Configurations for Analyzing the Implementation Cost.
CPU Frequencies
of Each Gateway
(Mining Nodes of
Public Mainchain)
CPU Frequencies
of Each Central
Mining Nodes
(Mining Nodes of
Private Side Blockchain)
Cycles
per Byte
Block Size
for private
sidechain
Block Size
for public
mainchain
[2GHZ, 2.8GHZ] [1GHZ, 2GHZ] 100 248 bytes 108 bytes
Since gateways and other IoT devices have different computational powers processing the
transactions, we set different CPU frequency for them in order to evaluate the authorization
and authentication time [71]. As shown in Table 5.4, we assume that the block sizes for private
side blockchain and public mainchain are respectively 248 bytes and 108 bytes. The CPU
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frequency for IoT center mining nodes and gateways are between [1GHz, 2GHz] and [2GHz,
2.8GHz], respectively.
5.4.3.2 Information Management Efficiency Performance
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Figure 5.8: Information management efficiency comparison among the proposed sidechain-
based method, traditional sidechain method and existing blockchain-based method.
Fig. 5.8 presents the information management efficiency comparison between the proposed
sidechain-based method, traditional sidechain method and existing blockchain-based method.
We use the processing time consumption during the device registration phase as the criterion
for this experiment. As we can observe from Fig. 5.8 that both sidechain methods have higher
time consumption compared with the blockchain method when the number of smart systems
in the IoT smart community is lower than 16. The reason is that the authorization time of the
sidechain-based method co nsists of two folds: time for creating one local block in private side
blockchain for saving the local authorization information and time for uploading a reference
block to the public mainchain for sharing purpose. Thus, when the number of smart systems
is low, the processing time for the proposed method would be high than the blockchain-based
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method, which only needs to store one blockchain in each gateway. However, with the num-
ber of smart systems increasing, the sidechain methods show their superiority of decreasing
implementation cost. For instance, they save more than 37.33% and 49.12% respectively of
processing time compared with the blockchain-based method when the number of smart sys-
tems reaches 100. Therefore, compared to the existing methods, our method could enhance the
information management efficiency at constrained IoT community.
5.4.4 Storage Consumption Comparison
Unlike the traditional sidechain structure, the public mainchain proposed in this work is viewed
as a reference database, and it requires the gateway to save simplified information blocks at
local memory. Whereas, both the blockchain-based method and traditional sidechain method
are required to update the full chain after each new block verification. In this subsection,
we compare the storage consumption at the gateway side among the conventional method,
blockchain-based method, traditional sidechain and proposed sidechain method.
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Figure 5.9: Storage consumption comparison between conventional method, blockchain-based
method, traditional sidechain and proposed sidechain model.
In this experiment, we consider a smart community with 5 smart systems and each system
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has 10 IoT devices. As mentioned in Section III, a local sidechain block contains device ID,
authentication method and authentication parameters as transactions. The first two transactions
(device ID and authentication method) are both 8 bytes. For the authentication parameters, we
take certificate-based authentication as an example. As mentioned in [76], the average message
size for the certificate-based authentication parameter is 148 bytes. Based on the quantitative
data listed about the size for block component in Table 4.2, the storage sizes required for the
conventional method, blockchain-based method, traditional sidechain and proposed sidechain
method are respectively 1.60 KB, 12.61 KB, 3.45 KB and 3.03 KB. The proposed sidechain
method only takes 24.02% of the memory space that the blockchain-based method has required,
and 87.82% of the memory space that the traditional sidechain method has required.
5.5 Chapter Summary
In a smart community with large amounts of Internet of Things (IoT) devices, the authenti-
cation process for each device is vital for protecting the security of personal data for each
user. Current authentication approaches suffer from numerous challenges when they are ap-
plied in a smart community, such as poor authentication efficiency, inflexible authentication
approach and insecure information sharing server. Blockchain technology, as a decentralized
peer-to-peer platform, provided a promising solution for managing the local authentication in-
formation and sharing the information within the smart community. However, it increased the
storage burden and the complexity of the local authentication process at the constrained IoT
device. Sidechain significantly reduces the information burden of the main blockchain by seg-
menting information into small blockchain systems and securely transferring key information
between different systems, whereas, the traditional two-way peg protocol it uses does not pro-
tect the system against certain attacks. In this chapter, we propose a novel sidechain structure
via optimized two-way peg protocol for the device authentication in smart community in order
to overcome the limitations of existing approaches. The proposed sidechain structure requires
the mining nodes of the mainchain to only store the local mainchain blocks without download-
ing or updating the entire mainchain after each block generation. By using Simplified Payment
Verification (SPV) consensus mechanism, the existence of the target authentication informa-
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tion could be proved. More importantly, we propose the optimized two-way peg protocol in
the proposed sidechain system in order to prevent the worthless information attack during the
authentication information sharing procedure. The simulation results prove the superiority of
the proposed scheme in terms of reducing authentication time, improving information man-
agement efficiency and decreasing storage consumption compared with existing works, and
the applicability and feasibility of the optimized two-way peg protocol have been approved.
Chapter 6
Conclusion and Future Work
6.1 Conclusion
In the first chapter, after a brief introduction to IoT networks, the motivation behind this thesis
is presented. Security protection is one of the fundamental parts of IoT networks since most of
IoT devices have constrained computational powers and imperfect self-protection mechanisms.
Most of existing IoT model still follow the traditional centralized model, which has a high risk
of one point failure. Therefore, the need for a secured decentralized IoT platform is undeniable.
Specifically, two scenarios in IoT networks were detailedly investigated in this thesis, namely,
IoT routing protection and device authentication in smart community.
The second chapter presents a comprehensive literature review of the existing challenges
and solutions in the area of IoT routing process and IoT smart community authentication pro-
cess. A large number of techniques and models have been studied, and their advantages and
drawbacks are reviewed in this chapter. In order to overcome existing challenges in both sce-
narios, we studied the blockchain technology and focused on applying the blockchain technol-
ogy into the IoT environments.
In Chapter 3, a detailed overview of blockchain technique has been firstly summarized,
including the whole procedure of encryption and decryption, the concept of proof of work
(PoW) and other blockchain related knowledge. Then, sidechain, an extended technology of
blockchain, has been demonstrated in details, including its structure, the two-way peg protocol
and the technology comparison results with blockchain. After that, several promising applica-
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tions of blockchain technology are summarized based on different application fields, such as
crypto-currency, identity management and medical applications. Finally, both advantages and
disadvantages of the blockchain technique are analyzed for future research.
In Chapter 4, we proposed a blockchain-based reputation management system for routing
process protection in IoT networks. By applying the blockchain technique onto the edge server,
the proposed distributed reputation management system can effectively handle the reputation
value of each router in the system. A global reputation management scheme was presented
to determine the reputation value for each router. To improve the implement efficiency of
blockchain, we also proposed an efficient group mining technique for the blockchain. Simu-
lation results demonstrated that the proposed schemes can improve the security level of rout-
ing process in IoT networks by detecting routers’ malicious behaviors. The convergence per-
formance of the proposed reputation management system was also evaluated, and the results
proved that the proposed technique has stable convergence with different network sizes. Fur-
thermore, result comparison between the proposed group mining process and existing methods
proved the efficiency of the proposed group mining process, which will directly reduce the
latency of generating blocks in the proposed blockchain based on RM system.
In Chapter 5, we proposed a novel sidechain-based decentralized authentication scheme
via optimized two-way peg protocol for smart community. By applying a optimized mainchain
and private side blockchains, the local device authentication process can be effectively handled
and a secured authentication information sharing procedure could be achieved. The optimized
two-way peg protocol was identified to dynamically monitor the trustworthy of target smart de-
vice to ensure the security of the smart community during the information sharing procedure.
Simulation results demonstrated that the proposed scheme could significantly reduce the au-
thentication time by comparing with the existing blockchain-based method. Furthermore, the
proposed optimized two-way peg protocol was also measured with different malicious authen-
tication cases, and its practicability and feasibility in evaluating the trustworthy of each smart
device have been confirmed. Moreover, compared with the blockchain-based authentication
method and traditional sidechain method, the proposed sidechain-based scheme has improved
the information management efficiency and reduced the storage burden at the gateway level.
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6.2 Future Work
For the future work, some aspects of the proposed algorithms are still worthwhile to be further
investigated. Some potential research works are summarized as follows.
6.2.1 The Proposed Blockchain-based Reputation Management System
In Chapter 4, we presented the proposed blockchain-based reputation management system for
IoT routing protection. The proposed model efficiently detect the misbehaving routers by cal-
culating the reputation values of each routers and blacklisting the malicious ones. There are
two aspects that we can further improve the model.
Edge Computing Optimization As we mentioned in the Section 4.2, the proposed blockchain-
based RM model is built on the edge layer due to the low data latency performance. However,
we did not further design the technical relation between the blockchain technology and edge
devices. There are many optimized edge computing algorithms designed for reducing the data
latency and improving OoS performance. By applying suitable edge computing algorithms into
the blockchain, the system efficiency and detection accuracy of the proposed blockchain-based
model could be significantly improved.
Task Reallocation in the Proposed Group Mining PoW Consensus Mechanism In order
to introduce the blockchain technology into the IoT routing protection, we optimized the tra-
ditional PoW consensus mechanism due to the resource-constrained nature of IoT devices. In
the proposed group mining process, IoT devices are equally grouped for mining a same block
based on their computational powers and locations. The inside group cooperation could be
achieved by allocating the total nonce value range to all the group members based on their dif-
ferent computational powers. There is a certain scenario that some group members with high
computational powers have already finished the allocated nonce task while other members are
still working on their parts. In this circumstance, these devices will wait until other members
finish, which will waste both time and resources. A better solution for this would be applying
a suitable task reallocation into the group mining. When some devices finish their task earlier
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than other group members, they can provide help to other with their extra available resources.
With a certain smart contract of task reallocation, the mining task could be distributed to the
members in a reasonable and intelligent way, and the efficiency of generating a block for a
group could be noticeably improved.
6.2.2 The Proposed Sidechain-based device Authentication Scheme
In Chapter 5, we presented a sidechain-based device authentication scheme for smart commu-
nity. The proposed sidechain model provides a local adaptive device authentication method for
IoT devices in each smart system, and a decentralized structure for managing the authentica-
tion information sharing procedure. Moreover, the proposed optimized two-way peg protocol
could evaluate the trustworthy of the target IoT device to decide whether its authentication in-
formation is allowed to be shared with other systems. There are two orientations that we can
further improve the work.
Optimized Two-way Peg Protocol Improvement In order to apply the sidechain technol-
ogy into device authentication in IoT smart community, we proposed an optimized two-way
peg protocol in order to prevent the worthless information attack during the information shar-
ing process between the mainchain and side blockchains. The proposed protocol guarantees
the data security for the whole community by dynamically monitoring the trust value of the
target IoT device. However, in order to increase the detection accuracy and QoS performance,
the protocol could be further enhanced by improving the trust evaluation algorithm. For exam-
ple, the equations for evaluating the trust for a device could add more criteria to improve the
detection accuracy performance. Moreover, we could apply the machine learning into the sys-
tem. Based on the previous authentication records, the malicious devices and behaviors could
be detected and predicted.
PoW Consensus Mechanism Optimization In the proposed sidechain-based device authen-
tication model, PoW consensus mechanism has been applied to generate new blocks in both
mainchain and side blockchains, which is considered as the most secured consensus mecha-
nism in blockchain-related technology. However, the resource-constrained IoT devices cannot
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meet the high computational power requirements cause by PoW consensus mechanism. The
group mining PoW proposed in Chapter 4 may not be appropriate to the mining process at
public mainchain due to the processing latency during the data transmission of the blockchain
update. Thus, an optimized PoW consensus mechanism could be designed for the sidechain-
based model in order to further enhance QoS performance.
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